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Executive Branch Contempt of Congress 
Josh Chafetz† 
After former White House Counsel Harriet Miers and White House Chief of Staff 
Joshua Bolten refused to comply with subpoenas issued by a congressional committee 
investigating the firing of a number of United States Attorneys, the House of Represent-
atives voted in 2008 to hold them in contempt. The House then chose a curious method 
of enforcing its contempt citation: it filed a federal lawsuit seeking a declaratory judg-
ment that Miers and Bolten were in contempt of Congress and an injunction ordering 
them to comply with the subpoenas. The district court ruled for the House, although that 
ruling was subsequently stayed and a compromise was reached. 
This Article examines the constellation of issues arising out of contempt of Congress 
proceedings against executive branch officials. After briefly describing the Miers litigation, it 
examines the development of legislative contempt against executive officials in Anglo-
American law. It shows that the contempt power played a significant role in power 
struggles between the Crown and Parliament and between the Crown and colonial 
American legislatures, and that this role continued into the early state legislatures. It then 
traces Congress’s uses of the contempt power against executive branch officials, includ-
ing in two cases that have generally been overlooked by both judicial and academic 
commentators, in which a house of Congress sent its sergeant-at-arms to arrest an ex-
ecutive branch officer. 
The Article then uses that history to consider how cases of executive branch con-
tempt of Congress should be dealt with today. It notes the variety of political tools that 
Anglo-American legislatures have used to enforce their contempt findings, as well as the 
fact that they did not turn to the courts to resolve such disputes until the late twentieth 
century. It then argues that the resolution of such disputes by the courts does significant 
harm to the American body politic. This Article therefore concludes both that Congress 
erred in seeking judicial resolution of the Miers dispute and that the courts erred in 
finding it justiciable. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2008, for only the second time in the nation’s history, a house of 
Congress sued high-ranking executive branch officials in an attempt to 
enforce a subpoena for their testimony in the face of the officials’ 
claims of executive privilege.
1
 Unlike the previous suit, in which the 
                                                                                                                           
 † Assistant Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.  
Thanks to Greg Alexander, Akhil Amar, Will Baude, Aaron Bruhl, Michael Dorf, Joey Fish-
kin, Marin Levy, Bernadette Meyler, David Pozen, Catherine Roach, and Steve Sachs for helpful 
and thought-provoking comments on earlier drafts, and to Kevin Jackson for excellent research 
assistance. Any remaining errors or infelicities are, of course, my own. 
 1 See Committee on the Judiciary v Miers, 558 F Supp 2d 53, 55–56 (DDC 2008) (holding 
that the House Judiciary Committee can bring an action in a district court to compel an execu-
tive official to testify before the committee). 
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defendant was none other than the president of the United States,
2
 the 
2008 suit was successful.
3
 This is a nearly perfect separation of powers 
storm: the legislature invoked the aid of the judiciary in an attempt to 
get what it wanted from the executive. More precisely, in seeking a dec-
laratory judgment that the executive officials must comply with the 
congressional subpoena, the House of Representatives was asking the 
court to adjudicate between the executive privilege of confidential 
communication and the legislative privileges of investigation and pu-
nishment for contempt. 
This Article examines the constellation of issues arising from such 
situations. It should be noted that this Article does not focus on the 
merits of any particular executive privilege claim. Rather, the focus 
here is on the various contempt options available to a house of Con-
gress to deal with an uncooperative executive branch, the options 
available for punishing executive branch officials, and the question of 
whether there is a role for the judiciary in such disputes. This necessar-
ily involves a historical examination of the role of the contempt power 
in disputes between Anglo-American legislatures and executives. The 
political context for these disputes is crucial; it is a fundamental con-
tention of this Article that the legislative contempt power has played, 
and should continue to play, a key role in resolving contested ques-
tions of the allocation of power within the federal government. 
Part I briefly describes both the events surrounding the House of 
Representatives’ 2008 determination that former White House Coun-
sel Harriet Miers and White House Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten were 
in contempt of Congress and the district court decision arising out of 
that determination. 
                                                                                                                           
 2 See Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v Nixon, 370 F Supp 
521, 522–24 (DDC 1974) (refusing to enforce a Senate committee’s subpoena against the presi-
dent because the committee did not demonstrate that the subpoenaed tapes were needed for 
further public hearings and nondisclosure was important to protect the fairness of pending crim-
inal prosecutions), affd 498 F2d 725, 733 (DC Cir 1974). Oddly, both the Congressional Research 
Service and the Judiciary Committee in the 2008 case at first seemed unaware of the Nixon 
precedent. See Morton Rosenberg and Todd B. Tatelman, Congress’s Contempt Power: Law, 
History, Practice, and Procedure 65 CRS Report RL34097 (Apr 15, 2008) (claiming mistakenly 
that the Miers suit is “the first civil lawsuit filed by a House of Congress in an attempt to enforce 
its prerogatives”); William Branigin, House Panel Sues to Force Bush Aides to the Table, Wash 
Post A3 (Mar 11, 2008) (“The committee’s action marked the first time in U.S. history that either 
chamber of Congress has sued the Executive Branch to enforce a subpoena, according to a spokesman 
for the House Judiciary Committee.”). The Nixon case is discussed at length in Part IV.B.3. 
 3 See Miers, 558 F Supp 2d at 56, 108 (ruling that the executive officials must testify in 
front of the committee and produce any nonprivileged documents requested through subpoena).  
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Part II begins the Article’s historical analysis of the scope of legis-
lative contempt findings, examining the development of the contempt 
power in the English Parliament. This historical treatment is necessary 
because Congress’s privileges have their origins in Parliament’s, and 
Congress has traditionally looked to parliamentary precedents in under-
standing its privileges.
4
 This Part pays special attention to the numerous 
findings of breach of privilege against Charles I and presents the onset of 
the English Civil War as a struggle between royal prerogative—a precur-
sor to executive privilege—and Parliament’s contempt powers. This Part 
demonstrates the ways in which contempt findings were used to combat 
attempts to consolidate and expand royal power, and it examines the 
numerous methods relied upon by the houses of Parliament to give 
teeth to their contempt findings. 
Part III traces the contempt power into preconstitutional Ameri-
ca, showing that both colonial legislatures and pre-1789 state legisla-
tures made use of the contempt power in their struggles with execu-
tive officials. That is, it traces how this parliamentary privilege came to 
be translated into American legislative practice. 
Part IV looks at the congressional houses’ contempt powers un-
der the Constitution. It shows that these British and preconstitutional 
American practices continued into a long American history of holding 
executive branch officials—including presidents themselves—in con-
tempt of Congress or breach of privilege. This Part moreover discusses 
two cases, which have been generally neglected by both judicial and 
academic commentators, in which a house of Congress sent its ser-
geant-at-arms to arrest an executive branch official. 
Finally, Part V considers the lessons of this historical treatment. It 
concludes that the houses of Congress have the authority to hold ex-
ecutive branch officials in contempt, and that defiance of a congres-
sional subpoena qualifies as contempt. Most notably, it argues that 
each house is properly understood as the final arbiter of disputes aris-
ing out of its contempt power—that is, when an executive branch offi-
cial raises executive privilege as a defense justifying her defiance of a 
congressional subpoena, the house of Congress is the proper tribunal 
to determine whether the invocation of executive privilege was ap-
                                                                                                                           
 4 In this regard, it is worth noting that Thomas Jefferson’s Manual of Parliamentary Prac-
tice, which remains the authoritative manual of practice in the House of Representatives and is 
widely consulted in Senate practice, discusses British precedent in great detail. See generally 
Thomas Jefferson, Manual of Parliamentary Practice, in Constitution of the United States of 
America, with the Amendments Thereto: To Which Are Added Jefferson’s Manual of Parliamentary 
Practice, the Standing Rules and Orders for Conducting Business in the House of Representatives 
and Senate of the United States, and Barclay’s Digest (GPO 1861). 
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propriate. This means that legislative-executive disputes over the con-
tempt power should be understood to be nonjusticiable. This Part 
notes that the houses of Congress, like their historical predecessors, 
have a large number of tools by which to enforce compliance with 
their contempt findings, including the powers of arrest, impeachment, 
and obstruction of the president’s agenda. Moreover, this Part argues 
that Congress has been wrong, since the 1970s, in seeking judicial en-
forcement of contempt citations against executive branch officials, and 
that the courts have been wrong in finding such disputes justiciable, 
for two reasons. First, the courts’ interpretation of Congress’s con-
tempt power has been substantively too stingy and court-centric; 
second, and perhaps more importantly, Congress’s abdication of this 
power aggrandizes the executive and judicial branches at Congress’s 
expense, upsetting the proper balance of the separation of powers. 
Finally, this Part will apply these lessons to Miers, arguing that this 
case shows that, while both the executive and judicial branches are 
comfortable pushing their powers to their limits, Congress has become 
too timid to do so. This Part argues that this congressional timidity is 
harmful to the polity as a whole. 
I.  THE MIERS CASE 
The events surrounding the Bush administration’s politically mo-
tivated dismissal of nine United States Attorneys in 2006 have been 
well described elsewhere, both in the scholarly
5
 and journalistic litera-
ture,
6
 and it is unnecessary to rehash the details here. For the purposes 
                                                                                                                           
 5 See, for example, John McKay, Train Wreck at the Justice Department: An Eyewitness 
Account, 31 Seattle U L Rev 265, 265–92 (2008) (providing an overview of the firing of the Unit-
ed States Attorneys and discussing the problems with politically motivated dismissals of prosecu-
tors); Mark J. Rozell and Mitchel A. Sollenberger, Executive Privilege and the U.S. Attorneys 
Firings, 38 Pres Stud Q 315, 319–24 (2008) (describing the confrontation between the president 
and Congress over whether the executive branch must turn over information); David C. Weiss, 
Note, Nothing Improper? Examining Constitutional Limits, Congressional Action, Partisan Moti-
vation, and Pretextual Justification in the U.S. Attorney Removals, 107 Mich L Rev 317, 322–27 
(2008) (examining the public information regarding the attorneys’ firings and concluding that 
legislation should be enacted to prevent partisan-inspired firings of federal prosecutors). 
 6 See, for example, Allegra Hartley, Timeline: How the U.S. Attorneys Were Fired, US News & 
World Rep (Mar 21, 2007), online at http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/070321/21attorneys-
timeline.htm (visited Sept 1, 2009) (providing a detailed chronology of the actions leading up to 
the United States Attorneys’ firings); Adam Zagorin, Why Were These U.S. Attorneys Fired?, 
Time (Mar 7, 2007), online at http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1597085,00.html 
(visited Sept 1, 2009) (same); Dan Eggen and Paul Kane, Fired U.S. Attorneys Tell of Calls, 
Threats before Dismissal, Wash Post A1 (Mar 7, 2007) (describing the various methods the White 
House used to force several United States Attorneys to resign); Dan Eggen, 6 of 7 Dismissed U.S. 
Attorneys Had Positive Job Evaluations, Wash Post A11 (Feb 18, 2007) (contradicting Alberto 
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of this Article, it suffices to note that, after the dismissals became pub-
lic, the House and Senate Judiciary Committees sought testimony and 
documents from various executive branch officials. In March 2007, 
White House Counsel Fred Fielding told the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee that the White House would allow the House and Senate Judi-
ciary Committees to conduct private interviews with White House ad-
visor Karl Rove, former White House Counsel Harriet Miers, Deputy 
White House Counsel William Kelley, and Rove aide Scott Jennings. 
The interviews were to be conducted behind closed doors, with no tran-
script taken, and with no oath having been administered; the commit-
tees would also have to agree not to subpoena those officials in the fu-
ture.
7
 The White House also agreed to turn over certain communica-
tions regarding the dismissals, but not any communications between 
White House officials.
8
 The committees rejected the offer,
9
 and two days 
later, the House Judiciary Committee voted to authorize subpoenas for 
the testimony of Rove, Miers, Kelley, Jennings, and Kyle Sampson, the 
former chief of staff to former Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, as 
well as documents in their possession concerning the firings.
10
 Although 
the subpoenas were authorized, the committee did not vote to issue 
them, in the hopes that the matter would be resolved through further 
negotiation with the White House.
11
 
On June 13, 2007, after almost three months of fruitless discus-
sions, the House Judiciary Committee issued two subpoenas: one to 
Miers, directing her to testify and produce certain documents, and the 
other to White House Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten, directing him to 
produce documents.
12
 (The Senate on the same day subpoenaed for-
                                                                                                                           
Gonzales’s assertions that the United States Attorneys had poor performance reviews); Dan 
Eggen, Prosecutor Firings Not Political, Gonzales Says, Wash Post A2 (Jan 19, 2007) (reporting 
Gonzales’s claim that the United States Attorneys were fired over “performance issues”). For an 
excellent detailed overview of the key events, see TPM Canned US Attorney Scandal Timeline, 
Talking Points Memo (May 14, 2007), online at http://www.talkingpointsmemo.com/usa-
timeline.php (visited Sept 1, 2009).  
 7 Sheryl Gay Stolenberg, Bush in Conflict with Lawmakers on Prosecutors, NY Times A1 
(Mar 21, 2007). 
 8 Id.  
 9 Id (quoting Senator Patrick Leahy that the offer “is not constructive” and that “it is not 
helpful to be telling the Senate how to do [the] investigation or to prejudge its outcome”). 
 10 Carl Hulse, Panel Approves Rove Subpoena on Prosecutors, NY Times A1 (Mar 22, 2007). 
 11 Id.  
 12 Miers, 558 F Supp 2d at 61 (detailing the timeline of the requests for testimony made by 
the House Judiciary Committee to Bolten and Miers).  
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mer White House political director Sara Taylor.
13
) On the advice of 
Acting Attorney General Paul Clement, President George W. Bush 
asserted executive privilege and informed the committees that the 
executive branch would neither produce the requested documents nor 
make the former officials available to testify.
14
 
When Miers and Bolten failed to respond to the subpoenas, Rep-
resentative Linda Sanchez, Chairwoman of the House Subcommittee 
on Commercial and Administrative Law, ruled that the assertion of 
executive privilege did not excuse them from complying with the sub-
poenas. Sanchez’s ruling was upheld by a vote of the subcommittee.
15
 
On July 25, 2007, the full House Judiciary Committee adopted a reso-
lution recommending that Bolten and Miers be cited for contempt of 
Congress.
16
 After several more months of failed attempts at a nego-
tiated settlement, the House of Representatives voted to hold Miers 
and Bolten in contempt on February 14, 2008.
17
 The House also 
adopted two resolutions: one provided for the Speaker to certify the 
Judiciary Committee’s report to the United States Attorney for the 
District of Columbia “to the end that [Miers and Bolten] be pro-
ceeded against in the manner and form provided by law,”
18
 while the 
other authorized the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee 
to initiate or intervene in judicial proceedings in any Federal 
court of competent jurisdiction, on behalf of the Committee on 
the Judiciary, to seek declaratory judgments affirming the duty of 
any individual to comply with any subpoena . . . issued to such in-
dividual by the Committee as part of its investigation into the fir-
ing of certain United States Attorneys and related matters, and to 
seek appropriate ancillary relief, including injunctive relief.
19 
Two weeks later, the Speaker of the House certified the contempt re-
port to Jeffrey Taylor, the United States Attorney for the District of 
Columbia,
20
 and she called on the Attorney General to ensure that 
                                                                                                                           
 13 Dan Eggen and Paul Kane, 2 Former Aides to Bush Get Subpoenas, Wash Post A1 (June 
14, 2007) (claiming that Taylor played a large role in efforts to name a former colleague as a 
United States Attorney).  
 14 Michael Abramowitz and Amy Goldstein, Bush Claims Executive Privilege on Subpoe-
nas, Wash Post A1 (June 29, 2007).  
 15 153 Cong Rec D969 (July 12, 2007); 153 Cong Rec D1015 (July 19, 2007). 
 16 153 Cong Rec D1055 (July 25, 2007). 
 17 154 Cong Rec H962 (Feb 14, 2008) (noting that the final vote was 223 to 32).  
 18 H Res 979, 2d Sess 110th Cong (Feb 13, 2008). 
 19 H Res 980, 2d Sess 110th Cong (Feb 13, 2008). 
 20 Letter from Representative Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the House, to Jeffrey A. Taylor, United 
States Attorney for the District of Columbia (Feb 28, 2008), online at 
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Taylor filed criminal contempt charges against Miers and Bolten.
21
 The 
next day, the Attorney General replied that, because (in the Depart-
ment of Justice’s view) Bolten and Miers had properly invoked execu-
tive privilege in refusing to comply with the subpoenas, “non-
compliance by Mr. Bolten and Ms. Miers with the Judiciary Commit-
tee subpoenas did not constitute a crime, and therefore the Department 
will not bring the congressional contempt citations before a grand jury 
or take any other action to prosecute Mr. Bolten or Ms. Miers.”
22 
The Judiciary Committee then filed suit in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia, seeking a declaratory judg-
ment that Miers and Bolten were in contempt and an injunction or-
dering them to comply with the congressional subpoenas.
23
 Miers and 
Bolten moved to dismiss on the grounds that the committee lacked 
standing to bring the suit, that there was no proper cause of action, 
that the suit was nonjusticiable, and that the court should decline ju-
risdiction on discretionary bases. They also entered a defense on the 
merits, arguing for a broad executive privilege.
24
 
On the question of standing, Miers and Bolten raised two argu-
ments: first, that the Judiciary Committee had not suffered a cogniza-
ble personal injury; and second, that the case did not present “the type 
of dispute traditionally capable of resolution before an Article III 
court.”
25
 As to the first argument, the court, relying on DC Circuit 
precedent, found that the committee had standing to sue to enforce a 
duly issued subpoena.
26
 The court found that the committee suffered 
injuries both in its loss of access to the information it sought and in 
“the institutional diminution of its subpoena power.”
27
 As to the 
second argument, the court found the case resolvable for two reasons:  
                                                                                                                           
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Pelosi080228.pdf (visited Sept 1, 2009) (citing the failure of 
Miers and Bolten to “appear, testify, and furnish certain documents” as required by the subpoena). 
 21 Letter from Representative Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the House, to Attorney General 
Michael B. Mukasey (Feb 28, 2008), online at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/PelosiToMukasey080228.pdf (visited Apr 22, 2009) (sug-
gesting that the Attorney General should not tolerate a witness ignoring a subpoena to appear before 
a federal grand jury). 
 22 Letter from Attorney General Michael B. Mukasey to Representative Nancy Pelosi, Speaker 
of the House 2 (Feb 29, 2008), online at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Mukasey080229.pdf 
(visited Sept 1, 2009). 
 23 Miers, 558 F Supp 2d at 55, 63–64. 
 24 Id at 55–56. 
 25 Id at 66. 
 26 Id at 68–71, citing United States v American Telephone and Telegraph Co, 551 F2d 384, 
391 (DC Cir 1976). 
 27 Miers, 558 F Supp 2d at 71. 
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(1) in essence, this lawsuit merely seeks enforcement of a sub-
poena, which is a routine and quintessential judicial task; and (2) 
the Supreme Court has held that the judiciary is the final arbiter 
of executive privilege, and the grounds asserted for the Execu-
tive’s refusal to comply with the subpoena are ultimately rooted 
in executive privilege.
28
  
For this second point, the court relied on the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in the Nixon Tapes Case
29
 and the DC Circuit’s opinion in Senate 
Select Committee v Nixon.
30
 Indeed, the latter case was procedurally 
very similar to the Miers case: The Senate Select Committee on Presi-
dential Campaign Activities brought a suit seeking a declaratory 
judgment that President Richard Nixon was legally obligated to comp-
ly with a congressional subpoena directing him to produce the White 
House tapes.
31
 Although the court ultimately held that the tapes were, 
in fact, covered by executive privilege, and therefore affirmed the 
lower court’s dismissal of the suit,
32
 it did reach the merits. In the view 
of the Miers court, this conclusively resolved the justiciability of the 
claim.
33
 Moreover, the court noted that the executive branch itself, in 
the form of two memos from the Justice Department’s Office of Legal 
Counsel (OLC), had concluded that civil suits to enforce a congres-
sional subpoena were justiciable.
34 
In response to Miers and Bolten’s argument that there was no 
cause of action here, the court held both that the Constitution itself 
gave Congress a right to investigate and therefore a cause of action 
that allowed it to invoke the Declaratory Judgment Act,
35
 and that it 
had “an implied cause of action derived from Article I to seek a judi-
                                                                                                                           
 28 Id. 
 29 United States v Nixon, 418 US 683 (1974).  
 30 498 F2d 725 (DC Cir 1974) (en banc).  
 31 Id at 726 (noting that the requested tapes were of five conversations between the presi-
dent and his former Counsel John W. Dean).  
 32 Id at 733 (concluding that the need demonstrated by the Select Committee was “too 
attenuated and too tangential to its functions”).  
 33 Miers, 558 F Supp 2d at 74 (noting that the Senate Select Committee court “evidently 
agreed” with the lower court’s explicit determination that the issue was justiciable “because it 
proceeded directly to the merits of the controversy”). 
 34 Id at 75–77. See also Charles Cooper, Response to Congressional Requests for Informa-
tion Regarding Decisions Made under the Independent Counsel Act, 10 Op Off Legal Counsel 68 
(1986) (“OLC Memo”); Theodore Olson, Prosecution for Contempt of Congress of an Executive 
Branch Official Who Has Asserted a Claim of Executive Privilege, 8 Op Off Legal Counsel 101, 
137 (1984) (“OLC Memo”). 
 35 Miers 558 F Supp 2d at 78–88 (referencing case law “indicating that the [Declaratory 
Judgment] Act ‘should be liberally construed to achieve the objectives of the declaratory remedy’”). 
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cial declaration concerning the validity of its subpoena power.”
36
 In 
responding to this second argument, Miers and Bolten claimed that 
the issue need not be justiciable because Congress could rely on its 
inherent contempt powers. To this, the court replied that 
imprisoning current (and even former) senior presidential advi-
sors and prosecuting them before the House would only exacer-
bate the acrimony between the two branches and would present 
a grave risk of precipitating a constitutional crisis. Indeed, one 
can easily imagine a stand-off between the Sergeant-at-Arms and 
executive branch law enforcement officials concerning taking Mr. 
Bolten into custody and detaining him. Such unseemly, provoca-
tive clashes should be avoided, and there is no need to run the 
risk of such mischief when a civil action can resolve the same is-
sues in an orderly fashion. [And] even if the Committee did exer-
cise inherent contempt, the disputed issue would in all likelihood 
end up before this Court, just by a different vehicle—a writ of ha-
beas corpus brought by Ms. Miers and Mr. Bolten. In either event 
there would be judicial resolution of the underlying issue.
37 
The court also suggested that Miers and Bolten were estopped from 
arguing that the House should have relied on its inherent contempt 
powers because the executive branch, in its OLC memos, had taken 
the position that the inherent contempt power was not available 
against executive branch officials.
38
 Moreover, the court noted that 
negotiations between the branches had reached a “stalemate” and 
were therefore unlikely to be resolved by the usual process of inter-
branch “accommodation and negotiation.”
39
 
Finally, the court rejected Miers and Bolten’s claim that it should 
exercise its equitable discretion to dismiss the suit.
40
 The court asserted 
that “the judiciary is the ultimate arbiter of claims of executive privi-
lege,” and therefore that the political branches take “the availability of 
ultimate judicial intervention in exactly this sort of controversy” as a 
background assumption.
41
 (Indeed, the court referred to itself as the 
“ultimate arbiter” of executive privilege claims five times over the 
                                                                                                                           
 36 Id at 88.  
 37 Id at 92 (quotation marks and citations omitted).  
 38 Id (stating that although the OLC opinions were not dispositive, the executive could not 
simultaneously question the availability of an alternative remedy while insisting that it must be 
exhausted before a civil cause of action is available).  
 39 Miers, 558 F Supp 2d at 92–93.  
 40 Id at 94–99. 
 41 Id at 96. 
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course of the opinion.
42
) As justification for the totality of its holdings 
that it could hear the case—that is, its holdings on standing, cause of 
action, and equitable discretion—the court proclaimed that “only 
judicial intervention can prevent a stalemate between the other two 
branches that could result in a particular paralysis of government op-
erations.”
43
 In the few remaining pages of its opinion, the court con-
cluded that neither Miers nor Bolten was protected by absolute ex-
ecutive privilege, but that both could still make specific claims of privi-
lege against specific demands by the committee.
44
 
Miers and Bolten appealed and moved for a stay pending appeal 
and expedited review. The DC Circuit granted the motion for a stay.
45
 
However, it denied the motion for expedited review on the grounds that 
even if expedited, this controversy will not be fully and finally re-
solved by the Judicial Branch—including resolution by a panel 
and possible rehearing by this court en banc and by the Supreme 
Court—before the 110th Congress ends on January 3, 2009. At 
that time, the 110th House of Representatives will cease to exist 
as a legal entity, and the subpoenas it has issued will expire.
46
 
Given the risk that the case would then become moot, the court found 
that expedited briefing would be useless.
47
 In a concurring opinion, 
Judge David Tatel argued that, if the case would become moot with 
the expiration of the congressional term, then a stay should not be 
issued; however, he was convinced that the case would survive the 
congressional term.
48
 
On March 4, 2009—a month and a half into the Obama adminis-
tration and two months into the 111th Congress—an agreement was 
reached under which Miers (and Rove) would testify under oath in 
closed proceedings and a number of documents would be turned over 
                                                                                                                           
 42 See id at 56, 76, 96, 103, 107.  
 43 Miers, 558 F Supp 2d at 99.  
 44 Id at 99–108.  
 45 Committee on the Judiciary v Miers, 542 F3d 909, 911 (DC Cir 2008) (per curiam).  
 46 Id.  
 47 Id.  
 48 Id at 911–12 (Tatel concurring) (emphasizing that “the successor Congress can assert the 
prior Committee’s investigatory interest”).  
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to the committee.
49
 Pending the testimony and document delivery, the 
DC Circuit granted the parties’ motion to stay the proceedings.
50 
It is the contention of this Article that all three branches—
including, and perhaps most significantly, Congress itself—have acted 
improperly in this case so as to diminish Congress’s constitutional 
powers. Defending this claim will require an examination of legislative 
findings of contempt against executive officials throughout Anglo-
American history, placed in the broader context of legislative-
executive power struggles. 
II.  CONTEMPT OF PARLIAMENT 
Contempt of Parliament—and its sibling, breach of parliamentary 
privilege
51
—have a long history in English law. Tracing that history, in-
cluding the context in which disputes between Parliament and the 
Crown gave rise to assertions of contempt or breach of privilege against 
Crown officers or even monarchs themselves, will help us understand 
the origin of the American contempt power and its appropriate scope. 
A. Contempt of Parliament as a Royal Offense 
The offense of contempt of Parliament dates to the institution’s 
inception. Parliament’s origins were as an advisory body meant to as-
sist the monarch in the administration of his kingdom.
52
 As such, the 
                                                                                                                           
 49 Carrie Johnson, Deal Clears Rove, Miers to Discuss Prosecutor Firings, Wash Post A8 (Mar 5, 
2009) (citing the desire of the White House to “avert a federal court showdown that could have 
restricted the authority of the president in future disputes with other branches of government”).  
 50 Per Curiam Order Filed Granting the Joint Motion to Stay Briefing and Oral Argument, 
Committee on the Judiciary v Miers, No 08-5357 (DC Cir Mar 5, 2009).  
 51 See Thomas Erskine May, Erskine May’s Treatise on the Law, Privileges, Proceedings and 
Usage of Parliament 75 (Lexis UK 23d ed 2004) (William McKay, ed): 
When any of these rights and immunities is disregarded or attacked, the offence is called a 
breach of privilege and is punishable under the law of Parliament. Each House also claims 
the right to punish contempts, that is, actions which, while not breaches of any specific privi-
lege, obstruct or impede it in the performance of its functions, or are offences against its au-
thority or dignity. 
See also Mary Patterson Clarke, Parliamentary Privilege in the American Colonies 206 (Da Capo 1971):   
Often [contempt] was synonymous with breach of privilege, and the House of Commons, as 
well as a colonial assembly, might use the two terms interchangeably. . . . Indeed, there is 
logically a very close relation between the two. Anything that was a recognized breach of the 
assembly’s privilege might be considered contemptuous; and any expression of contempt was 
in clear violation of the “undoubted right” of the assembly to be treated with dignity. 
 52 See Josh Chafetz, Leaving the House: The Constitutional Status of Resignation from the 
House of Representatives, 58 Duke L J 177, 185 (2008) (noting that “Parliament’s origins lie in 
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earliest contempts were treated as offenses against the Crown. In 
1290, the Prior of the Holy Trinity cited the Earl of Cornwall to ap-
pear before the Archbishop of Canterbury. The King had also sum-
moned the Earl to Parliament, and serving process on a member of 
Parliament during a session was considered a breach of parliamentary 
privilege.
53
 Both the Prior and the man who actually served the cita-
tion were summoned before the King, who had them both sent to the 
Tower of London.
54
 Likewise, in 1404, Richard Cheddre, the servant of 
a member of Parliament,
55
 was “emblemished and maimed even to the 
peril of death” by John Sallage.
56
 The House petitioned the King for a 
draconian system of punishments for such offenses: 
[I]f any man shall kill or murther any that is come under your 
protection to Parliament, that it be adjudged treason; and if any 
do maim or disfigure any such so come under your protection, 
that he lose his hand; and if any do assault or beat any such so 
come, that he be imprisoned for a year, and make fine and ran-
some to the king: and that it would please you of your special 
grace hereafter to abstain from charters of pardon in such cases, 
unless that the parties be fully agreed.
57 
The King was unwilling to assent to this general scheme, but he did 
command Sallage to appear before the King’s Bench. There, he was 
                                                                                                                           
the medieval curia regis, the king’s council”); Jeffrey Goldsworthy, The Sovereignty of Parlia-
ment: History and Philosophy 22 (Clarendon 1999): 
The first parliaments were meetings of the King and his tenants-in-chief, in which he sought 
their counsel, consent, and material support in discharging his principal responsibilities, the 
defence of the realm and the dispensation of justice within it. The acts of those parliaments 
were acts of the King, and their authority was his authority, fortified by counsel and consent.  
Charles Howard McIlwain, The High Court of Parliament and Its Supremacy: An Historical 
Essay on the Boundaries between Legislation and Adjudication in England 14–38 (Yale 1910) 
(describing the development of Parliament from its origins as the king’s council). 
 53 See Henry Elsynge, The Manner of Holding Parliaments in England 184–85 (Richardson 
& Clark 1768) (describing the Prior’s attempt to serve process on the Earl of Cornwall and the 
King’s reaction thereto); Edward Coke, The Fourth Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England: 
Concerning the Jurisdiction of Courts 24 (Flesher 1644) (describing the same events). For a his-
torical discussion of the parliamentary privilege against civil arrest and legal process, see Josh 
Chafetz, Democracy’s Privileged Few: Legislative Privilege and Democratic Norms in the British 
and American Constitutions 111–33 (Yale 2007). 
 54 Elsynge, The Manner of Holding Parliaments in England at 184–85 (cited in note 53).  
 55 Many of the privileges of members of Parliament also applied to members’ servants 
until the late seventeenth century. See Chafetz, Democracy’s Privileged Few at 124–29 (cited in 
note 53) (describing the privileges enjoyed by servants of members of Parliament).  
 56 Elsynge, Manner of Holding Parliaments in England at 189 (cited in note 53).  
 57 Id at 190. 
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ordered to pay double damages, plus a fine and ransom to the Crown.
58
 
In 1433, a law was passed making double damages, fine, and ransom 
the punishments for all cases of assault upon a member of Parlia-
ment.
59
 The fact that the fine and ransom were paid to the Crown, as 
well as the fact that they were dispensed through the mechanisms of 
royal justice, make it clear that the contempt was against the King. The 
fifteenth-century Parliament did not yet have sufficient institutional 
independence for the assault on Cheddre to be considered a matter 
for the House’s own cognizance.
60
 
B. Contempt of Parliament as an Offense Punishable in Parliament 
Beginning in the sixteenth century, however, the houses them-
selves began to punish contempts. In 1543, George Ferrers, a member 
of Parliament from Plymouth, was arrested in London pursuant to an 
action in the King’s Bench to recover a debt (for which Ferrers served 
as a surety).
61
 Upon being notified of Ferrers’s arrest, the House of 
Commons sent its sergeant to demand his release.
62
 Rather than sur-
render him, however, the jailers, “after many stout words[,] . . . forcibly 
resisted” the sergeant’s demands.
63
 In the resulting melee, the sergeant 
“was driven to defend himself with his mace of armes, and had the 
crown thereof broken by bearing off a stroke, and his man stroken 
down.”
64
 The London sheriffs arrived on the scene but promptly sided 
with the jailers against the sergeant.
65
 The sergeant returned to the 
House of Commons and reported; the Commons took the matter “in so 
ill part, that they all together . . . rose up wholly, and retired to the Up-
per House,” where they acquainted the Lords with their grievances.
66
 
The House of Lords, “judging the contempt to be very great, re-
ferred the punishment thereof to the order of the Commons House.”
67
 
                                                                                                                           
 58 Id at 190–91. 
 59 11 Hen 6, ch 11 (1433). 
 60 For other examples of pre-sixteenth-century Parliaments appealing to the Crown to 
vindicate their privileges, see Chafetz, Democracy’s Privileged Few at 112–16, 145–47 (cited in 
note 53) (describing the House of Commons’s reliance on the Crown to enforce its privileges); 
Chafetz, 58 Duke L J at 185 (cited in note 52) (noting that resignation from Parliament required 
the King’s permission). 
 61 John Hatsell, 1 Precedents of Proceedings in the House of Commons; With Observations 
53 (Hughs 2d ed 1785). 
 62 Id.  
 63 Id at 53–54.  
 64 Id at 54.  
 65 Hatsell, 1 Precedents of Proceedings in the House of Commons at 54 (cited in note 61). 
 66 Id.  
 67 Id.  
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The Lord Chancellor, a Crown official,
68
 offered to arm the sergeant 
with a royal writ, but “the Commons House refused, being of a clear 
opinion, that all commandments and other acts proceeding from the 
[House of Commons], were to be done and executed by their Serjeant 
without writ, only by shew of his mace, which was his warrant.”
69
 Mean-
while, the London sheriffs, having received word of “how haynously the 
matter was taken” and having decided that discretion was the better 
part of valor, decided to turn Ferrers over without a fight when the 
sergeant returned.
70
 The sergeant, upon securing Ferrers’s release, 
charged the sheriffs, jailers, and the person upon whose suit Ferrers was 
arrested in the first place, to appear before the House of Commons the 
next morning to answer for their contempt of Parliament.
71
 
When they appeared in the House, they were denied counsel. Af-
ter they spoke in response to the contempt charge, the sheriffs and the 
person who instituted the suit were committed to the Tower of Lon-
don, and the arresting officer and most of the jailers were sent to 
Newgate prison.
72
 The jailer who started the physical confrontation 
with the sergeant was committed to the Little Ease dungeon
73
 of the 
Tower of London.
74
 The House released its prisoners three days later, 
but only after “humble suit made by the Mayor of L[ondon] and other 
their friends.”
75
 
In addition to being a member of the House of Commons, Ferrers 
was also a servant of King Henry VIII. After the Commons released 
the sheriffs and jailers, the King called prominent members of the 
House before him. 
First commending their wisdome in maintaining the Privileges of 
the House (which he would not have to be infringed in any 
point) alledged that he, being head of the Parliament, and attend-
                                                                                                                           
 68 See F.W. Maitland, The Constitutional History of England 202 (Cambridge 1963) (H.A.L. 
Fisher, ed) (noting that, through Tudor times, “the chancellor is the king’s first minister”). 
 69 Hatsell, 1 Precedents of Proceedings in the House of Commons at 54–55 (cited in note 61). 
 70 Id at 55.  
 71 Id.  
 72 Id.  
 73 The Little Ease was a cell so small that a prisoner could not fully stretch out in any 
direction. “He was obliged to sit in a squatting position and was kept confined there.” L.A. Parry, 
The History of Torture in England 80 (Sampson Low 1933). For an insightful discussion of the 
psychological impact of this form of torture, see Albert Camus, The Fall 109–10 (Knopf 1984) 
(Justin O’Brien, trans) (“Mon cher, there was genius—and I am weighing my words—in that so 
simple invention. Every day through the unchanging restriction that stiffened his body, the con-
demned man learned that he was guilty and that innocence consists in stretching joyously.”). 
 74 Hatsell, 1 Precedents of Proceedings in the House of Commons at 55 (cited in note 61). 
 75 Id at 55–56.  
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ing in his own person upon the business thereof, ought in reason 
to have Privilege for him, and all his servants attending there 
upon him. So that if the said Ferrers had been no Burgess, but on-
ly his servant, that in respect thereof he was to have the Privilege, 
as well as any other. For I understand, quoth he, that you, not on-
ly for your own persons, but also for your necessary servants, 
even to your cooks and horse-keepers, enjoy the said Privilege. 
 . . . And further, we be informed by our Judges; that we at no 
time stand so highly in our Estate Royal, as in the time of Par-
liament; wherein we as Head, and you as Members, are conjoin’d 
and knit together into one Body Politick, so as whatsoever of-
fence or injury (during that time) is offered to the meanest 
Member of the House, is to be judg’d as done against our Person 
and the whole Court of Parliament; which prerogative of the 
Court is so great (as our learned Counsel informeth us) as all acts 
and processes coming out of any other inferior Courts, must for 
the time cease and give place to the highest.
76 
Beneath the superficial pleasantries, there lay a struggle over the role 
of Parliament in the English constitutional order. The Commons’s re-
fusal to accept the Lord Chancellor’s proffered writ constituted an 
assertion that the House’s contempt power was independent of royal 
authority. The sergeant needed only show his mace, the symbol of the 
authority vested in him by the House, in order to free Ferrers and im-
prison those who held him. The King, by contrast, attempted to reas-
sert Parliament’s role as his advisory body. His claim that his servants 
should be accorded parliamentary privilege was a claim that privilege 
was intended to help members of Parliament serve the King. 
Henry’s words notwithstanding, it was the House’s deeds that set 
the tone for the future. Without royal assistance, the House of Com-
mons had freed Ferrers and imprisoned those who had violated the 
House’s privileges. Henceforth, it would be the House, and the House 
alone, that would punish contempts. By punishing these contempts 
itself, the House asserted an institutional identity independent from 
the Crown: contempts were no longer interferences with the function-
ing of royal governance; rather, they were interferences with the 
House’s ability to do its own business. 
One important consequence of this change was that it became 
conceivable to hold Crown officers—indeed, even monarchs them-
selves—in contempt. When Parliament was just one instrument of 
                                                                                                                           
 76 Id at 56–57.  
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royal governance, a dispute between Parliament and some (other) 
Crown official was determinable by reference to what the monarch 
wanted. But with Parliament beginning to assert institutional powers 
distinct from the Crown, it became possible to conceive of contempts 
committed by Crown officials. A number of cases, beginning in the late 
sixteenth century, makes this clear. 
C. Contempt against Crown Officials 
In 1566, a joint committee of the Lords and Commons sent 
Queen Elizabeth a petition requesting both that she “dispose [herself] 
to marry, where it shall please [her], with whom it shall please [her], 
and as soon as it shall please [her],” and that she settle the matter of 
succession in case she should die unmarried and without heirs.
77
 The 
Queen sent back a brief reply assuring Parliament that all would be 
settled in due course.
78
 A number of members of the House of Com-
mons were unsatisfied and spoke critically of the Queen’s refusal to 
address directly their concerns.
79
 In response, Elizabeth summoned 
thirty members of the House of Commons, as well as the Lords who 
had served on the joint committee that drafted the petition, to appear 
before her.
80
 When they appeared, she delivered “a smart reproof,” 
albeit one in which “she mixed some sweetness with maj[esty].”
81
 She 
“promised them to manage things not only with the care of a prince, 
but the tenderness of a parent.”
82
 And she forbade them to discuss 
issues of succession any further.
83
 
In the House of Commons, Paul Wentworth questioned whether 
forbidding further discussion of an issue constituted a breach of privi-
lege.
84
 This question was extensively debated on the day it was raised, 
and the next day, the Speaker of the House of Commons was again 
summoned to appear before the Queen.
85
 There, she commanded him 
to allow no further discussion of the matter.
86
 This command was inef-
                                                                                                                           
 77 William Cobbett, 1 Parliamentary History of England 711 (Hansard 1806).  
 78 Id at 714–15 (“[I]f I can bend my liking to your need, I will not resist such a mind.”).  
 79 Cobbett records that some members spoke “with much heat and great insolence” and 
that they were “so audacious as to back their pertness with invectives and abuses.” Id at 715.  
 80 Id at 716.  
 81 Cobbett, 1 Parliamentary History of England at 716 (cited in note 77). 
 82 Id.  
 83 Id. For a different version of this address, albeit one with the same tenor, see J.E. Neale, 
1 Elizabeth I and Her Parliaments, 1559–1581 146–50 (Alden 1953). 
 84 Cobbett, 1 Parliamentary History of England at 716 (cited in note 77). 
 85 Id.  
 86 Id.  
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fectual—the House immediately appointed a committee to draft a 
response.
87
 The document produced by this committee suggested that, 
in ordering the House to cease debate, the Queen had infringed upon 
their traditional liberties, and it urged her to lift the restraint.
88
 Al-
though this petition was never presented to the Queen, the Commons 
did request a meeting with her to discuss their privileges.
89
 Realizing 
that, as long as the Commons believed that she was infringing on their 
liberties, the House would refuse to attend to other business, Eliza-
beth gave in.90 Two weeks after ordering the House to suspend discus-
sion of the succession issue, the Queen revoked that command, al-
though she made it known that she “desired the house to proceed no 
further in the matter at that time.”
91
 This incident is important, not 
simply because of the outcome—that is, in a dispute framed in the 
language of royal prerogative versus parliamentary privilege, the latter 
won—but also precisely because it was framed in those terms. That is, 
both the House and the Queen herself thought it conceivable that the 
Queen could breach parliamentary privilege. 
A similar pattern, in which the House won a contest that pit 
claims of prerogative against those of privilege, played out only a few 
years later, in 1571. That year, William Strickland, a member of the 
House of Commons, was summoned before the Queen’s Council and 
ordered not to attend the House because he had introduced a bill 
moving for the reformation of the Book of Common Prayer.
92
 (As 
Elizabeth was head of the Church of England,
93
 she considered all 
matters of religion to fall within her royal prerogative and, therefore, 
outside of Parliament’s purview.
94
) Several members argued that this 
                                                                                                                           
 87 Neale, 1 Elizabeth I and Her Parliaments at 154 (cited in note 83).  
 88 Id at 155–56 (protesting that surely “your Majesty meant not . . . to diminish our accus-
tomed liberties”).  
 89 Id at 156.  
 90 Id.  
 91 Cobbett, 1 Parliamentary History of England at 716 (cited in note 77). 
 92 Id at 761–62, 765. For background on the dispute between Elizabeth and the 1571 Par-
liament over religious reforms, see generally J.E. Neale, Parliament and the Articles of Religion, 
1571, 67 Eng Hist Rev 510 (1952).  
 93 See Act of Supremacy, 1534, 26 Hen 8, ch 1:  
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interference of the Crown in Strickland’s performance of his parlia-
mentary duties constituted a breach of privilege.
95
 Christopher Yelver-
ton insisted that Strickland’s arrest created a “perilous” precedent,
96
 
and that the House had a right to debate “all matters not treason, or 
too much to the derogation of the imperial crown.”
97
 He concluded 
that “it was fit for princes to have their prerogatives; but yet the same 
to be straitened within reasonable limits.”
98
 The next day, the Queen 
yielded and Strickland was again allowed to attend the House.
99
 
D. Charles I 
But it was during the reign of the House of Stuart that clashes be-
tween royal prerogative and parliamentary privilege really came to 
the fore. In 1621, for example, James I ordered the House of Com-
mons to stop meddling in the “mysteries of state” when it questioned 
his desire to marry off the Prince of Wales to the Spanish Infanta.
100
 
When the House replied that freedom of speech and debate was part 
of its “ancient and undoubted right,”
101
 James claimed that all privileg-
es derived from royal grace—but insisted that he would be glad to 
show the House that grace, so long as it refrained from encroaching on 
royal prerogative.
102
 When the House replied by passing a resolution 
reasserting the claim that its privileges were its “ancient and un-
doubted birthright,”
103
 James responded by sending for the Commons’s 
journal, tearing out their protestation, declaring it “invalid, annulled, 
void, and of no effect,” imprisoning some of the parliamentary rin-
gleaders, sending others off to Ireland as royal commissioners, and 
dissolving Parliament.
104
 
James’s fights with Parliament were nothing, however, as com-
pared to those of his son. Indeed, Charles I’s clashes with Parliament 
are worth discussing in great detail because they were often framed as 
clashes between royal prerogative and legislative privilege. Some of 
these clashes look rather familiar, as when Charles repeatedly asserted 
                                                                                                                           
 95 Cobbett, 1 Parliamentary History of England at 761–63 (cited in note 77). 
 96 Id at 762.  
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 99 Cobbett, 1 Parliamentary History of England at 765 (cited in note 77). 
 100 Id at 1326–27.  
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a right, grounded in royal prerogative, to withhold documents from 
Parliament and to prevent his advisors from having to testify before 
Parliament. In fact, the English Civil War can well be thought of as the 
victory of parliamentary privilege over such claims of royal preroga-
tive—indeed, as the ultimate finding of contempt of Parliament. This 
is, of course, not the only way of thinking about the origins of the Civil 
War, and the treatment below necessarily gives short shrift to other 
important issues, especially religious conflict.
105
 By focusing on the con-
flict between Crown and Parliament, this Part aims to give a clearer 
picture of the growth and development of Parliament’s ability to hold 
Crown officials, including the King, in contempt. 
Charles had come to the throne with “his heart . . . set upon a war 
with Spain, a war which, though approved by the last parliament of his 
father, had not yet been declared, and might easily have been 
avoided.”
106
 But going to war required money, which Charles would 
have to requisition from Parliament. For two centuries, whenever a new 
monarch ascended the throne, Parliament had immediately granted him 
the customs duties of tonnage and poundage for the rest of his life.
107
 
However, in 1625, the House of Commons, upset that the new King 
showed no intention of redressing some of the House’s grievances re-
maining from his father’s reign,
108
 voted to grant tonnage and poundage 
for only a single year.
109
 As a result, the House of Lords rejected the bill, 
leaving Charles to collect the duties without any statutory authoriza-
tion.
110
 Although the Commons passed a resolution declaring that “we 
will be ready in convenient time, and in a Parliamentary way freely and 
                                                                                                                           
 105 On the importance of religious conflict to the English Civil War, see Roger Lockyer, The 
Early Stuarts: A Political History of England 1603–1642 302–04 (Longman 1989). 
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dutifully to . . . afford all necessary Supply to his most Excellent Majesty, 
upon his present, and all other his just Occasions and Designs,”
111
 
Charles despaired of getting any more money out of the House and 
accordingly dissolved Parliament.
112
 
However, the defeat of English forces at Cadiz shortly after the 
dissolution of Parliament,
113
 along with heightening tensions between 
England and France,
114
 meant that Charles soon found himself in des-
perate need of new funds.
115
 He was therefore forced to call a new Par-
liament in early 1626.
116
 In an attempt to ensure that this Parliament 
went more smoothly for him, Charles appointed six of the more cha-
rismatic leaders of the previous Parliament to the post of sheriffs, 
which made them legally ineligible to sit in the new Parliament.
117
 The 
Commons, however, resented these perceived invasions of its privileg-
es, and it refused to grant the King the funds he sought until after its 
concerns about its privileges had been addressed.
118
 Moreover, parlia-
mentary opposition to the Duke of Buckingham, a royal favorite, had 
been growing in the 1625 Parliament, where he was accused of bearing 
primary responsibility for the lackluster conduct of the war and for 
Charles’s heavy-handed approach to parliamentary relations.
119
 In the 
1626 Parliament, the Commons “commenced with redoubled vigour” 
its investigation of Buckingham.
120
 When the Commons explicitly con-
ditioned the granting of funds to the King on his addressing their 
grievances,
121
 he replied: 
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I must let you know, that I will not allow any of my servants to be 
questioned amongst you, much less such are as of eminent place, 
and near under me. . . . I see you specially aim at the duke of 
Buckingham. . . . [I] can assure you, he hath not meddled, or done 
any thing concerning the public or common wealth, but by spe-
cial directions and appointment, and as my servant.
122 
The House, however, was not chastened, and continued its proceed-
ings against Buckingham.
123
 Additionally, a committee report, which 
was accepted by the House, proposed that funds be granted to the 
King as soon as “they had presented their grievances, and received his 
answer to them.”
124
 
Charles promptly summoned both houses to appear before him, 
and, after thanking the Lords for their “care of the state of the king-
dom,”
125
 he turned to chastising the Commons for behaving in an “un-
parliamentary” manner.
126
 The Lord Keeper, speaking on the King’s 
behalf, then made it clear that Charles would  
by no means suffer [royal prerogative] to be violated by any pre-
tended colour of parliamentary liberty; wherein his maj. doth not 
forget that the parliament is his council, and therefore ought to 
have the liberty of a council; but his maj. understands the differ-
ence betwixt council and controlling, and between liberty and the 
abuse of liberty.
127
  
The King was particularly outraged by the ongoing proceedings 
against Buckingham, and the Lord Keeper declared that Charles re-
garded any attack on the Duke as an attack on himself.
128
 Accordingly, 
Charles ordered the Commons to “yield obedience unto those direc-
tions which you have formerly received, and cease this unparliamenta-
ry inquisition.”
129
 Charles also took exception to the House’s presum-
ing to question his counselors and to its having “sent a general war-
rant to his signet-office, and commanded his officers, not only to pro-
duce and shew the records, but their books and private notes, which 
they made for his maj.’s service.”
130
 That is, to use somewhat anachro-
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nistic language, he made a protest, grounded in executive privilege, to 
the Commons’s summoning royal officials to testify and ordering 
them to produce documents. Finally, the promised funds from the 
House were deemed wholly inadequate.
131
 The King ordered the 
House to deliberate quickly and return an answer to the question of 
“what further Supply you will add to this you have already agreed on; 
and that to be without condition”; noncompliance, he threatened, 
would be punished by dissolution.
132
 
In reply, the Commons asserted that “it hath been the antient, 
constant, and undoubted right and usage of parliaments, to question 
and complain of all persons, of what degree soever, found grievous to 
the common-wealth, in abusing the power and trust committed to 
them by their sovereign.”
133
 In other words, the parliamentary power of 
investigation trumps assertions of executive privilege. The Commons 
then set aside all other business—including the King’s request for 
funds—to proceed against Buckingham.
134
 On May 10, 1626, the 
Commons presented thirteen articles of impeachment against Buck-
ingham to the House of Lords.
135
 
The Lords were, at the time, locked in their own struggle with the 
Crown over their privileges, and were therefore perhaps less inclined 
to look favorably on Buckingham than they might otherwise have 
been. Several months earlier, Charles had committed the Earl of 
Arundel to the Tower of London.
136
 Although the King did not imme-
diately give a reason, some thought that the cause was the marriage of 
the Earl’s eldest son to a relative of the King’s—a match of which the 
monarch did not approve.137 Others noted, however, that Arundel was 
one of Buckingham’s arch-opponents in the House of Lords and sug-
gested that this factor explained his imprisonment.
138
 Whatever the 
King’s reason, the House of Lords, concerned that Arundel’s impri-
sonment might constitute an attack on its privileges, began looking 
into the matter.
139
 Upon learning of the House’s inquiry, the King sent 
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the Lord Keeper to communicate to the House that “the earl of 
Arundel was restrained for a misdemeanor which was personal to his 
majestie, and lay in the proper knowledge of his majestie, and had no 
relation to matters of Parliament.”
140
 The House of Lords then formed 
a subcommittee to inquire into the matter.
141
 Upon learning of this, the 
King sent a second message, assuring the House that he had acted 
“justly” and had “not diminished the privilege of the house.”
142
 The 
House was unconvinced, however, and resolved that “no lord of Par-
liament, sitting the Parliament, or within the usual times of privilege of 
Parliament, is to be imprisoned, or restrained, without sentence or 
order of the House; unless it be for treason or felony, or for refusing to 
give surety for the peace.”
143
 There followed a month of messages sent 
back and forth between the King and the House, in which the House 
pressed its privilege claim and demanded an immediate answer and 
Charles insisted that an answer would be forthcoming in due course.
144
 
Finally, when the House’s patience was exhausted, it suspended all 
other business “that consideration might be had how their privileges 
may be preserved unto posterity.”
145
 (Among the business that did not 
proceed while the Lords were pondering their privileges was the 
Duke of Buckingham’s attempt to respond to the impeachment 
charges.
146
) The King sent word that he was “resolved, to satisfy your 
lordships fully in what you then desired,”
147
 but the Lords adjourned, 
refusing to do any business until they were satisfied.
148
 When the 
House reconvened a week later, the King again tried to postpone rep-
lying to its assertion of privilege.
149
 The Lords again resolved “all other 
business to cease, but this of the earl of Arundel’s concerning the pri-
vilege of the house.”
150
 Five days later, on June 8, 1626, Arundel was 
released.
151
 Again, it is worth noting that the Crown here acquiesced in 
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the assertion by a house of Parliament that the King’s actions consti-
tuted a breach of privilege. 
Four days after Arundel’s release, the King’s supporters in the 
House of Commons made one final attempt to get the House to pro-
vide the funds the King sought. The attempt went nowhere, and, on 
June 15, Charles dissolved his second Parliament.
152
 However, the 
Crown’s need for funds continued to increase,
153
 and with Charles un-
willing to make the compromises necessary to receive a parliamentary 
grant of supply, he turned to fundraising methods of dubious constitu-
tionality. Most notably, he ordered his treasury officials to collect the 
duties of tonnage and poundage, despite the fact that Parliament had 
refused to grant him this right,
154
 and he ordered the collection of a 
“forced loan”—that is, he required that his subjects provide a loan 
proportional to the value of their property.
155
 These two devices led to 
massive public resistance.
156
 When Randolph Crewe, the Chief Justice 
of the King’s Bench, refused to bless the legality of these measures, 
Charles summarily dismissed him and replaced him with someone 
more compliant.
157
 The new Chief Justice, Nicholas Hyde, promptly 
denied habeas petitions by those who had been imprisoned for refus-
ing to pay the forced loan.
158
 
The growing resistance to the Crown’s use of prerogative powers 
to raise funds, combined with the increasing need for funds, forced 
Charles in 1628 to call his third Parliament.
159
 In the hopes of convinc-
ing the new Parliament to be generous, Charles released all those who 
had been imprisoned for refusing to pay the forced loan. Of the seven-
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ty-six who had been imprisoned for that reason, twenty-seven were 
elected to the new Parliament.
160
 As Conrad Russell has noted, this 
Parliament assembled “with the conscious and deliberate aim of vin-
dicating English liberties.”
161
 Although Charles was desperate for im-
mediate funds,
162
 the Commons would do nothing until their liberties 
were addressed. Accordingly, less than three months after the Parlia-
ment was assembled, Charles was compelled to give his assent to the 
Petition of Right,
163
 in which, among other things, he promised to levy 
no more forced loans.
164
 While Charles was considering whether or not 
to assent to the Petition, the Commons voted him both tonnage and 
poundage and additional subsidies, but they refused to finalize the 
grants until he had given satisfactory assent to the Petition.
165
 After 
Charles gave in to the House’s demands, the House voted him subsi-
dies, but not tonnage and poundage.
166
 The House drew up a remon-
strance, explaining that there was insufficient time before the end of 
the parliamentary session to prepare an adequate bill granting him 
tonnage and poundage,
167
 and warning Charles against attempting to 
collect the duties on his own: “[T]he receiving of Tunnage and Poun-
dage, and other Impositions, not granted by Parliament, is a breach of 
the Fundamental Liberties of this Kingdom, and contrary to your Ma-
jesty’s Royal Answer to the said Petition of Right.”
168 Before the re-
monstrance could be presented to him, however, Charles prorogued 
the Parliament: 
Now since I am certainly informed, that a . . . Remonstrance is 
preparing for me, to take away my Profit of my Tonage and 
Poundage (One of the Chief Maintenances of the Crown) by al-
leging, that I have given away my Right thereof by my Answer to 
your Petition; this is so prejudicial unto me, that I am forced to 
end this Session some few Hours before I meant it, being not 
willing, to receive any more Remonstrances, to which I must give 
a harsh Answer.
169 
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Roughly two months after Parliament was prorogued, Buckingham 
was assassinated by a disgruntled army veteran.
170
 This assassination 
removed from the royal court one of the strongest advocates for the 
ongoing wars with Spain and France,
171
 wars which were already 
broadly unpopular.
172
 This raised the possibility of peace but did noth-
ing to alleviate the King’s immediate need for funds. During the pro-
rogation, Charles continued to collect tonnage and poundage without 
parliamentary sanction.
173
 London merchants, many of whom were 
either members of Parliament or friends of members, openly rebelled, 
at one point breaking into the royal customs warehouse and taking 
back goods that had been impounded because of their refusal to pay 
the duties.
174
 When Parliament reconvened on January 20, 1629, 
Charles was facing a “full-fledged merchant revolt.”
175
 
Two days into the new session, the House of Commons impa-
neled a committee to look into the complaints of John Rolle, a mer-
chant and a member of the House.
176
 The gist of Rolle’s complaint was 
that “his goods were seized by the officers of the customs, for refusing 
to pay the rates by them demanded.”
177
 Two days later, Charles ad-
dressed both houses of Parliament, telling them that the best way to 
ensure that the collection of tonnage and poundage without parlia-
mentary approval would not become a precedent for future expansive 
interpretations of royal prerogative would be to retroactively author-
ize tonnage and poundage since the beginning of his reign.
178
 The 
House did not take this suggestion well, refusing even to debate a bill 
granting tonnage and poundage.
179
 The King was displeased—he sent a 
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message expressing his hope that the House would take up the bill,
180
 
followed the next day by another message expressing his expectation 
that the House would do so and pointedly noting that he “expects ra-
ther thanks than a remonstrance.”
181
 The House chose not to proceed 
with tonnage and poundage. 
On February 10, Rolle came before the House and complained 
that his warehouse had been locked and he had been served with a 
subpoena to appear in the Star Chamber.
182
 Sir Robert Philips told his 
colleagues in the House that such actions made them “the subject of 
scorn and contempt” and insisted that the House inquire “by whose 
procurement this subpoena was taken forth: if those that throw these 
scorns upon us may go unquestioned, it is in vain to sit here.”
183
 When 
the customs official who had seized Rolle’s goods came before the 
House, he explained that he had seized the goods under royal authori-
ty.
184
 Moreover, he reported that “the king sent for him on Sunday last, 
and commanded him to make no further answer” to the House.
185
 The 
House was outraged. John Selden thundered, “If there be any near the 
king that misinterpret our actions, let the curse light on them, and not 
on us: I believe it is high time to right ourselves; and until we vindicate 
ourselves in this, it will be vain for us to sit here.”
186
 The next day, the 
royal warrant by which the duties were collected was laid before the 
House. In it, Charles ordered the customs officials to collect tonnage 
and poundage “as they were in the time of our . . . father. . . . And if 
any person shall refuse to pay, then our will is, that the lords of the 
council and the treasurer shall commit to prison such so refusing.”
187
 In 
other words, the warrant asserted Charles’s prerogative powers to col-
lect the same tonnage and poundage duties that his father had col-
lected, despite the fact that Parliament had specifically authorized 
James to collect tonnage and poundage and had specifically denied 
Charles that right. As Philips remarked, “Thus you see how fast the 
prerogative of the king doth intrench on the liberty of the subject, and 
how hardly it is recovered.”
188
 There was some debate as to whether 
the House should construe the royal warrant as authorizing the collec-
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tion of the duties against members of Parliament, or whether the 
House should assume that the customs officials had acted outside the 
scope of the warrant.
189
 Nathaniel Rich welcomed the possibility of 
asserting that the customs officials had acted outside of the scope of 
the warrant, saying that it provided “a way open to go to this question, 
without relation to the king’s commission or command.”
190
 Charles, 
however, was spoiling for a fight: he dispatched Sir John Coke to in-
form the House that the customs officials acted “by his own direct 
orders and command, or by order of the council-board, his maj. him-
self being present; and, therefore, would not have it divided from his 
act.”
191
 Charles thereby forced the House’s hand: either it would have 
to back down and allow tonnage and poundage to be collected, even 
from its own members, on the strength of royal prerogative powers 
alone, or it would have to assert that the King had breached parlia-
mentary privilege. 
The House chose the latter route, and passed a resolution ex-
pressing its belief that parliamentary privilege extended to members’ 
goods.
192
 John Eliot read in the House a proposed remonstrance to the 
Crown, in which he asserted that the collection of tonnage and poun-
dage generally without parliamentary consent was “a breach of the 
fundamental liberties of this kingdom, and contrary to your majesty’s 
royal Answer to the Petition of Right.”
193
 When Eliot finished reading 
his proposed remonstrance, he moved for a vote on presenting it to 
the King.
194
 The Speaker refused, claiming that the King had com-
manded him to rise from the Speaker’s chair, thereby adjourning the 
House.
195
 At this point, several members of the House forcibly held the 
Speaker in his chair, while the House passed three resolutions, one of 
which read, “Whosoever shall counsel, or advise, the taking and levy-
ing of the subsidies of Tunnage and Poundage, not being granted by 
Parliament; or shall be an actor or instrument therein, shall . . . be re-
puted an innovator in the government, and a capital enemy to this 
kingdom and commonwealth.”
196
 Meanwhile, the King, having heard 
that the House continued to sit against his express command, sent for 
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troops to break down the door of the House, but the House adjourned 
before the troops arrived.
197
 
On the day that the House reconvened after this adjournment, 
the King dissolved Parliament.
198
 In his statement of reasons, he laid 
the blame entirely at the feet of the Commons, reserving special um-
brage for the Commons’s position on the issue of tonnage and poun-
dage.
199
 He complained specifically that, in the course of investigating 
his levying of the duties, the members of the House  
send for the officers of the customs, enforcing them to attend, day 
after day, by the space of a month altogether; they cause them to 
produce their letters patent under our great seal, and the war-
rants made in our privy council, for levying of those duties. They 
examine the officers upon what questions they please, thereby to 
entrap them for doing our service and commandment.
200
 
Even more outrageous to Charles was that the House “sent messen-
gers to examine our attorney general, (who is an officer of trust and 
secrecy) touching the execution of some commandments of ours, of 
which, without our leave first obtained, he was not to give account to 
any but ourself.”
201
 That is, he considered it a breach of his royal pre-
rogative to have his subordinates and their records examined by the 
House. He was, finally, outraged at the extension of privilege to mem-
bers’ goods, a privilege he proclaimed that he would “never admit.”
202
 
Charles governed without Parliament for the next eleven years, 
until a Scottish revolt and the ensuing Bishops War once again forced 
him to convene Parliament in April 1640 for the purpose of raising 
money.
203
 The Commons, however, refused to consider granting any 
funds until Charles addressed their grievances—chief among which 
were the Crown’s continuing use of prerogative taxation (including 
tonnage and poundage)
204
 and the House’s insistence that its privileges 
had been breached in 1629 both by the Crown’s order to the Speaker 
to adjourn the House, and by the subsequent prosecution of the mem-
bers who held the Speaker in his chair in order to allow House busi-
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ness to continue.
205
 Charles, outraged, dissolved the new Parliament a 
mere three weeks after it had assembled;
206
 this Parliament has been 
known to posterity as the “Short Parliament.” 
Military defeat by the Scots and continuing lack of funds forced 
Charles to call another Parliament—his final—in November 1640.
207
 It 
will come as no surprise that this Parliament assembled in no mood to 
kowtow to the Crown.
208
 The clash came to a head in January of 1642, 
when Charles accused five members of the House of Commons and 
one member of the House of Lords of treason, and had his attorney 
general bring accusations against them before the House of Lords.
209
 
Simultaneously, royal officers had gone to the homes of the accused 
members and sealed their studies.
210
 Both houses were outraged. The 
Commons immediately passed a resolution stating that  
the several Parties now sealing up the Trunks or Doors, or seizing 
the Papers of . . . any . . . Member of this House, that the Serjeant 
shall be informed of, shall be forthwith apprehended, and 
brought hither, as Delinquents; And that the Serjeants shall have 
Power to break open the Doors, and to break the Seals off from 
the Trunk.
211  
The Commons further resolved that if  
any Person whatsoever shall offer to arrest or detain the Person 
of any Member of this House, without first acquainting this 
House therewith, and receiving further Order from this House, 
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[then] it is lawful for such Member, or any Person to assist him, 
to stand upon his and their Guard of Defence, and to make Re-
sistance, according to the Protestation taken to defend the Privi-
leges of Parliament.
212
 
In other words, the House authorized armed resistance to Crown of-
ficers acting on the King’s behalf, on the grounds that such actions 
were a breach of parliamentary privilege. The Commons moreover 
sought a meeting with the Lords, both to discuss this breach of privi-
lege, and, more ominously, to discuss the deployment of armed guards 
around the Palace of Westminster.
213
 After the meeting, the Lords, 
likewise, resolved that the sealing of the members’ studies was a 
breach of privilege and that there should be armed guards around 
Parliament.
214
 Charles, meanwhile, sent a message to the Commons 
demanding that the five accused members of that house be delivered 
into his custody.
215
 The House replied that it would consider the matter 
and get back to him.
216
 
The next day, by order of the Commons, the five accused mem-
bers attended the House.
217
 The Journals entry for that day ends ab-
ruptly with the notation: 
His Majesty came into the House; and took Mr. Speaker’s Chair. 
“Gentlemen,” 
“I AM sorry to have this Occasion to come unto you 
* * * * 
Resolved, upon the Question, That the House shall adjourn itself 
till To-morrow One of Clock.
218 
Fortunately, other sources fill in where the overwhelmed Journals 
clerk left off. John Rushworth, who was, at the time, the Clerk-
Assistant to the House of Commons,
219
 recounted that, as soon as the 
accused members assembled in the House, news arrived that “his Ma-
jesty was coming with a Guard of Military Men, Commanders and 
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Souldiers.”
220
 In order to avoid violence, the House ordered the five 
members to leave immediately.
221
 Shortly thereafter, the door of the 
House was “thrown open,” and Charles entered, attended by his 
troops.
222
 Not seeing any of the five members in attendance, he as-
cended to the Speaker’s chair and informed the House that, when he 
had the previous day sent a messenger demanding that the five mem-
bers be delivered to him, he “did expect Obedience, and not a Mes-
sage.”
223
 He insisted that parliamentary privilege did not protect mem-
bers against charges of treason and that he would expect them to be 
delivered as soon as they returned to the House.
224
 When he asked the 
Speaker where the members had gone, the Speaker rather coura-
geously replied, 
May it please your Majesty, 
I Have neither Eyes to see, nor Tongue to speak in this place, but 
as the House is pleased to direct me, whose Servant I am here, 
and humbly beg your Majesties Pardon, that I cannot give any 
other Answer than this, to what your Majesty is pleased to de-
mand of me.
225 
The King then left the chamber; as he was going out “many Members 
cryed out, aloud so as he might hear them, Privilege! Privilege!”
226 
The next day, the House of Commons passed a resolution declar-
ing the King’s action to have been  
a high Breach of the Rights and Privilege of Parliament, and in-
consistent with the Liberties and Freedom thereof: And therefore 
this House doth conceive, they cannot, with the Safety of their 
own Persons or the Indemnity of the Rights and Privilege of Par-
liament, sit here any longer without a full Vindication of so high a 
Breach, and a sufficient Guard wherein they may confide.
227 
As the King was walking the streets of London later that day, “some 
People did cry out aloud Priviledges of Parliament! Priviledges of Par-
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liament!”
228
 Five days later, Charles left London, first moving his court 
to Hampton Court and then to York.
229
 Within two days, the House 
declared that anyone who arrested a member of Parliament “by Pre-
tence or Colour of any Warrant issuing out from the King only, is 
guilty of the Breach of the Liberties of the Subject, and of the Privi-
lege of Parliament, and a publick Enemy to the Commonwealth.”
230
 By 
the next month, “[t]he conflict had [ ] extended from Westminster to 
the country at large, and civil war became inevitable.”
231
 And, indeed, 
the Battle of Edgehill—marking the beginning of the Civil War—took 
place that October.
232
 
After the ensuing six years of bloody struggle, the House of 
Commons,
233
 on January 6, 1649, created a High Court of Justice to try 
Charles for treason. In the act creating the Court, the House declared 
that Charles “hath had a wicked design totally to subvert the ancient 
and fundamental laws and liberties of this nation, and in their place to 
introduce an arbitrary and tyrannical government.”
234
 The charges ul-
timately pressed against Charles focused on his acts of war against 
Parliament between 1642 and 1648,
235
 but the preamble to the charges 
asserted broadly that Charles had acted  
out of a wicked design to erect and uphold in himself an unli-
mited and tyrannical power to rule according to his will, and to 
overthrow the rights and liberties of the people, yea, to take away 
and make void the foundations thereof, and of all redress and 
remedy of misgovernment, which by the fundamental constitu-
tions of this kingdom were reserved on the people’s behalf in the 
                                                                                                                           
 228 Rushworth, 3 Historical Collections at 479 (cited in note 220). 
 229 Id at 484. 
 230 2 HC J 373 (Jan 12, 1642).  
 231 Christopher Hill, The Century of Revolution: 1603–1714 112 (Nelson 1961). 
 232 Id. 
 233 The Commons had, two days earlier, declared themselves “the Supreme Power in this 
Nation,” thus obviating the need for the consent of the Lords or the Crown to any piece of legis-
lation. 6 HC J 111 (Jan 4, 1649).  
 234 The Act Erecting a High Court of Justice for the King’s Trial (passed Jan 6, 1649), re-
printed in Gardiner, ed, The Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution at 357 (cited in 
note 154).  
 235 This “minimalist approach” to the charges was taken against the wishes of chief prosecu-
tor John Cooke and a number of the other trial commissioners. Sean Kelsey, The Trial of 
Charles I, 118 Eng Hist Rev 583, 598–99 (2003) (suggesting that Cooke desired additional 
charges that included complicity in James I’s supposed murder, imposing taxes and oaths con-
trary to undertakings given at his coronation, and conspiring to reintroduce Catholicism).  
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right and power of frequent and successive Parliaments, or na-
tional meetings in Council.
236
  
Charles, who refused to recognize the legitimacy of the High Court,
237
 
was convicted on January 27, 1649,
238
 and executed on January 30. Par-
liament would govern without a King until the Restoration in 1660. 
Importantly, many of the complaints leveled against Charles—
including the event that precipitated his departure from London in 
1642—were characterized as contempts of Parliament or breaches of 
parliamentary privilege. Everything from Charles’s illegal collection of 
tonnage and poundage, to his attempt to keep troublemakers out of 
Parliament by appointing them sheriffs, to his attempts to protect 
Buckingham, to his arrest of Arundel, to his violation of the Petition 
of Right, to his seizure of Rolle’s goods, to his attempt to arrest the 
five members accused of treason was framed by the House in terms of 
contempt and breach of privilege. Indeed, we have even seen exam-
ples of what might somewhat anachronistically be called a clash be-
tween executive privilege and parliamentary privilege, as when 
Charles repeatedly refused to allow his ministers and close advisors to 
be questioned by Parliament, or when he complained about the 
House’s demands that Crown officers turn over certain documents. 
Most dramatically, of course, the House used its privileges not only as 
a shield to protect the five members accused of treason in 1642, but 
also as a sword to justify resistance to Charles after he barged into 
their chamber in search of the members. Charles’s flight from London 
was precipitated by Parliament’s—and much of the nation’s—outrage 
over that breach of privilege. 
E. The Restoration and Revolution Settlements 
Although the House of Commons’s rule without King or Lords 
was short-lived, the Restoration Parliaments were determined not to 
countenance a return to claims of unfettered royal prerogative. Thus, in 
response to Charles II’s appointment of Edmund Jennings, a member of 
                                                                                                                           
 236 The Charge against the King (Jan 20, 1649), reprinted in Gardiner, ed, The Constitutional 
Documents of the Puritan Revolution at 372 (cited in note 154).  
 237 See The King’s Reasons for Declining the Jurisdiction of the High Court of Justice 
(Jan 21, 1649), reprinted in Gardiner, ed, The Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolu-
tion, at 374–76 (cited in note 154).  
 238 See The Sentence of the High Court of Justice upon the King (Jan 27, 1649), reprinted in 
Gardiner, ed, The Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution at 377–80 (cited in 
note 154). See generally Trial of King Charles I, 4 How St Tr 1045 (1649) (reprinting many of the 
relevant documents of the trial, including the Journal of the High Court). 
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the House, as Sheriff of York in 1675, even the Cavalier-dominated Par-
liament passed a resolution declaring it to be a “Breach of the Privi-
lege of this House, for any Member thereof to be made a Sheriff dur-
ing the Continuance of Parliament.”
239
 That is, the House found im-
permissible Charles II’s use of the same procedure for removing 
members from the House that his father had used in 1626.
240
 
It was, of course, Charles II’s brother, James II, who attempted to 
revive some of his father’s ideas about royal power.
241
 This, famously, 
ended poorly for James. The Revolution Settlement that emerged in 
1689 was the triumph of law—that is, legislation passed through Par-
liament—over royal prerogative.
242
 In putting William and Mary on the 
throne, Parliament prescribed a new Coronation Oath under which 
the first thing a new monarch swore was to “Governe the People of 
this Kingdome . . . according to the Statutes in Parlyament Agreed on 
and the Laws and Customs of the same.”
243
 With the Mutiny Act,
244
 Par-
liament created a criminal offense of mutiny from the army,
245
 but pro-
vided that the law would sunset in one year.
246
 This ensured that the 
new monarchs would have to either disband the standing army or call 
a Parliament at least once a year—otherwise, their soldiers could 
desert without consequence. Either choice would prevent a return to 
royal tyranny. Moreover, after the Revolution, Parliament never again 
granted the Crown large sums of money for the life of the monarch; 
rather, William and Mary and their successors had to come to Parlia-
ment for appropriations each year—and Parliament was not shy about 
                                                                                                                           
 239 9 HC J 378 (Nov 16, 1675). 
 240 See text accompanying note 117.  
 241 See George Macaulay Trevelyan, The English Revolution, 1688–1689 32–40 (Oxford 
1965) (noting James’s attempt to rule by prerogative power after he was unable to get his legisla-
tive program through Parliament). 
 242 Id at 71. 
 243 Coronation Oath Act, 1 W and M, ch 6, § 3 (1689). 
 244 Mutiny Act, 1 W and M, ch 5 (1689).  
 245 Previously, there had been no statutory offense of mutiny from the army. James II had 
exercised his prerogative powers to remove judges until he found some who would declare desertion 
from the army to be a felony. See Trevelyan, The English Revolution at 36–37 (cited in note 241) (ob-
serving that “packing of the Judicial Bench” was essential to James II’s policies); W.S. Holdsworth, 6 
A History of English Law 228–30 (Little, Brown 1924). Accordingly, the preamble of the Mutiny 
Act provides that “noe Man may be forejudged of Life or Limbe or subjected to any kinde of pu-
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ing to the knowne and Established Laws of this Realme.” 1 W and M, ch 5, § 1. 
Note that the concern of the Mutiny Act is with the army alone, as the navy was not seen as 
a threat to domestic liberty. See William Blackstone, 1 Commentaries on the Laws of England 
*405 (Chicago 1979) (referring to the navy as “the floating bulwark of the island; an army, from 
which, however strong and powerful, no danger can ever be apprehended to liberty”). 
 246 Mutiny Act, 1 W and M, ch 5, § 8.  
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exacting something in return.
247
 And finally, Parliament required Wil-
liam and Mary to assent to the Bill of Rights,
248
 which laid out Parlia-
ment’s complaints against James II’s government and declared illegal, 
among other things, prerogative taxation and the Crown’s asserted 
power to suspend or dispense with the laws.
249
 
The Revolution Settlement became further entrenched in subse-
quent years. After Mary’s death, when it was clear that neither William 
nor his successor, Mary’s sister Anne, would have any children, Parlia-
ment passed the Act of Settlement
250
 to ensure that the Crown did not 
return to the House of Stuart.
251
 The Act therefore provided for the 
Crown to pass to the House of Hanover upon Anne’s death
252
—and it 
imposed several new restrictions on royal power (including good-
behavior tenure for judges), all of which were not to take effect until 
the Hanovers came to the throne.
253
 The Act of Settlement was therefore 
a natural successor to the Bill of Rights: in both cases, Parliament bes-
towed the Crown on a new house, but only after first cabining the 
power of that Crown.
254
 
As the power of Parliament vis-à-vis the Crown thus increased, it 
became the norm that the King’s ministers should be chosen from the 
same party that controlled Parliament.
255
 The principle of ministerial 
responsibility to Parliament thereafter developed and strengthened 
over the course of the eighteenth century.
256
 As actual executive power 
devolved from the person of the King to his ministers, and as those 
ministers became increasingly tied to Parliament, the principle of par-
                                                                                                                           
 247 Trevelyan, The English Revolution at 96 (cited in note 241) (“Money was not voted till 
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 250 12 & 13 Will 3, ch 2 (1701). 
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 252 12 & 13 Will 3, ch 2, § 1.  
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 254 See Chafetz, 58 Duke L J at 188 n 49 (cited in note 52) (describing the Act of Settlement 
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 255 Trevelyan, The English Revolution at 96 (cited in note 241). 
 256 See Maitland, The Constitutional History of England at 395–96 (cited in note 68) (noting that 
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liamentary control over the execution of the laws became ever more 
firmly entrenched.
257
 This direct answerability of Crown officials to 
Parliament meant that breach of privilege and contempt of Parliament 
became less necessary tools for Parliament to use against recalcitrant 
executive officials. More direct mechanisms of control, such as confi-
dence votes, increasingly became available.
258
 Across the Atlantic, 
however, the American colonies and states carried on the tradition of 
using breach of privilege and contempt proceedings as a means of 
controlling the executive. 
III.  CONTEMPT IN PRECONSTITUTIONAL AMERICA 
A. Contempt of Colonial Legislatures 
The colonial American legislatures tended to model themselves 
on the House of Commons—particularly in matters relating to their 
privileges and procedures.
259
 More specifically, as Jack Greene has 
demonstrated, the behavior of the colonial legislatures was “deeply 
rooted” in the political tradition arising out of parliamentary opposi-
tion to the Stuart monarchs.
260
 That is to say, the colonists were apt to 
see an abuse of royal prerogative in every action of a colonial gover-
nor, and they were apt to look to the privileges of their elected assem-
blymen for protection. In Greene’s words,  
                                                                                                                           
 257 See Trevelyan, The English Revolution at 96 (cited in note 241) (“The accounts were 
carefully scrutinized by the Committees of the House of Commons; and woe to the Minister who 
used any sum for other purposes than those assigned by the appropriation.”). 
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ings against executive officials. In 1963, the House of Commons held John Profumo, the Secre-
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Embassy. After he resigned, the House decided not to punish Profumo. For the report of the 
government inquiry into the matter, see generally Alfred Denning, Lord Denning’s Report (Her 
Majesty’s Stationary Office 1963). For all the tawdry details, see generally Anthony Summers 
and Stephen Dorril, Honeytrap (Coronet 1988).  
 259 See Daniel J. Hulsebosch, Constituting Empire: New York and the Transformation of 
Constitutionalism in the Atlantic World, 1664–1830 55 (North Carolina 2005) (noting that, in the 
New York colonial assembly, “[l]egislative procedure followed parliamentary lines”); Jack P. 
Greene, Negotiated Authorities: Essays in Colonial Political and Constitutional History 197 (Vir-
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[C]olonial legislators had a strong predisposition to look at each 
governor as a potential Charles I or James II, to assume a hostile 
posture toward the executive, and to define with the broadest 
possible latitude the role of the lower house as “the main barrier 
of all those rights and privileges which British subjects enjoy.”
261 
In some circumstances, however, adopting the principles underlying the 
Westminster model might mean adopting a somewhat different proce-
dural emphasis than the House of Commons.
262
 Parliament in the eigh-
teenth century had less and less need to rely on contempt and breach of 
privilege in order to keep the executive in line, as new and stronger 
methods of ministerial accountability to Parliament became instituted 
and regularized.
263
 But in the colonies, the governor was not legally ans-
werable to the assembly.
264
 Thus, in the struggle between executive and 
legislative authority, the latter had to rely on other methods. 
Certainly, the contempt power was a familiar one to colonial as-
semblies. Perhaps most famously, in 1722, the young Benjamin Frank-
lin was given his first chance at running a newspaper when the New 
England Courant, published by his brother James, to whom Benjamin 
was apprenticed, ran an article that “gave Offence to the [Massachu-
setts] Assembly.”
265
 James was “taken up, censur’d and imprison’d for a 
Month by the Speaker’s Warrant.”
266
 This use of the contempt power 
                                                                                                                           
 261 Id at 199 (quoting a 1728 address of the Pennsylvania Assembly to the Lieutenant Gov-
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2009] Executive Branch Contempt of Congress 1121 
 
against private citizens was quite common in the colonies,
267
 as it was in 
England.
268
 But what about contempt against executive—that is, 
Crown—officials? 
The colonial assemblies were actually quite willing to use their 
contempt powers against Crown officials. The South Carolina House 
of Commons was particularly active in this regard—it arrested the 
Provost Marshal in 1726 for ignoring an order of the House, the Chief 
Justice in 1728 for refusing to appear before the House, the Council 
clerk for insolence in 1729, and the Surveyor General and his deputy 
in 1733 for contradicting its orders.
269
 In 1749, the Virginia House of 
Burgesses arrested the public printer for printing a resolution of the 
Council that the House found offensive.
270
 In 1733, the North Carolina 
Assembly arrested a Receiver of the Powder Money for refusing to 
submit his accounts to the House, and it attempted to arrest the Chief 
Justice for presenting a petition that displeased it.
271
 In 1722, the Mas-
sachusetts House of Representatives fought a “long-drawn-out con-
troversy with the Governor” over the House’s right to call before it 
the two heads of the colonial forces in Maine.
272
 The House finally se-
cured their presence, and, having determined that the two had acted 
culpably, “brought about the[ir] retirement.”
273
 When one of them con-
tinued exercising the functions of his office nonetheless, the House 
ordered him taken into custody.
274
 
Indeed, on occasion, assemblies were even willing to accuse royal 
governors themselves of breach of privilege. In 1763, in the midst of a 
dispute over whether the governor had the authority to determine 
that certain members of the assembly were ineligible to serve, the 
                                                                                                                           
 267 See Clarke, Parliamentary Privilege at 206–07 (cited in note 51); Ernest J. Eberling, 
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Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for Contempt, 74 U Pa L Rev 691, 700–12 (1926) (provid-
ing examples of arrests for legislative contempt in the colonies for offenses ranging from arrest-
ing members of the House (or their servants), to insulting members, to refusing to testify before 
the assembly). 
 268 See Chafetz, Democracy’s Privileged Few at 193–206 (cited in note 53) (discussing Par-
liament’s use of the contempt power against private subjects). 
 269 Jack P. Greene, The Quest for Power: The Lower Houses of Assembly in the Southern 
Royal Colonies 1689–1776 215–16 (North Carolina 1963). 
 270 Elmer I. Miller, The Legislature of the Province of Virginia: Its Internal Development 151 
(Columbia 1907).  
 271 Greene, The Quest for Power at 216 (cited in note 269). 
 272 Potts, 74 U Pa L Rev at 708 (cited in note 267). 
 273 Id at 708 n 53. 
 274 Id. 
1122 The University of Chicago Law Review [76:1083 
 
South Carolina House of Commons resolved that “his Excellency the 
governor, by having repeatedly and contemptuously denied the just 
claims of this house (solely to examine and determine the validity of 
the elections of their own members) hath violated the rights and privi-
leges of the commons house of assembly of this province.”
275
 The 
House further resolved not to “enter in any further business with him, 
until his excellency shall have done justice to this house.”
276
 In the 
midst of a dispute with Governor George Clinton in 1747, the New 
York House of Representatives passed a series of resolutions accusing 
Clinton of breaching its privileges and asserted, “Whoever advised his 
Excellency to send this message . . . has attempted to . . . subvert the 
Constitution of this Colony, and is an Enemy to the inhabitants the-
reof.”
277
 The House also drew up a lengthy remonstrance, which Clin-
ton forbade the public printer to print.
278
 When the printer was brought 
before the House and produced the governor’s warrant, the House 
declared the warrant “arbitrary and illegal” and ordered him to print 
the remonstrance.
279
 In 1767, the New York House of Representatives 
was insistent that Richard Jackson, a colonial official, be fired. The 
governor made it clear that he would not assent to the dismissal until 
some payment was also granted to Jackson. The House declared that 
such a demand was “an unconstitutional exercise of your power, and 
in breach of the privilege of the House.”
280
 Although the House ear-
nestly desired Jackson’s firing, “[W]e are not disposed to purchase it at 
the expense of our privileges as well as of our money.”
281
 And another 
New World colonial legislature, the Jamaican Assembly, declared the 
governor guilty of a “high breach of privilege” for taking notice of 
proceedings in the legislature not properly presented to him.
282
 
Finally, it should be noted that arrest and strong words were not 
the only options available to an aggrieved colonial legislature. Al-
though they had a voice neither in appointing nor in removing gover-
nors, the legislatures did exercise a significant amount of control over 
the finances of the colonies. Thus, when the Massachusetts Assembly 
in 1720 thought that the governor and lieutenant governor were in-
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fringing on its rights, it reduced the governor’s salary and paid him 
later than usual—and in rapidly depreciating currency, at that.
283
 The 
lieutenant governor’s salary “was also cut down to such an insignifi-
cant sum that he returned it in disgust.”
284
 In 1734, the South Carolina 
House of Commons, angry that the royally appointed chief justice had 
sided with the royally appointed governor in a dispute with the legisla-
ture, provided no salary at all for the chief justice.
285
 
We can thus see that colonial legislatures largely picked up where 
the pre–Glorious Revolution Parliaments left off. They had no hesita-
tion in using their breach of privilege and contempt powers against 
colonial governors and other royal officials, and they had methods 
ranging from censure to arrest to the withholding of salary in order to 
give teeth to their contempt findings. 
B. Contempt of Preconstitutional State Legislatures 
This deep suspicion of executive authority was reflected in the 
sorts of executives that the newly independent Americans began 
creating in 1776.
286
 Indeed, the president under the Articles of Confe-
deration was simply the presiding officer of the Continental Congress, 
with no independent authority or powers.
287
 Actual executive power 
was wielded by the Congress itself.
288
 There was, therefore, no inde-
pendent executive who might incur the wrath of the legislature—in 
this regard, the government under the Articles of Confederation was 
similar to the British government after the solidification of the Revo-
lution Settlement.
289
 The Continental Congress was, however, familiar 
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with contempt procedures, as several findings of contempt against 
private citizens demonstrate.
290
 
The state governments continued to exercise wide-ranging con-
tempt powers in the years between independence and the drafting of 
the federal Constitution. Indeed, contempt findings against Crown 
officials played an important role in two states at the dawn of the 
Revolution. In June 1775, as the siege of Boston was underway, Lord 
Dunmore, the royal governor of Virginia, fearing for his safety, left 
Williamsburg in the middle of the night and took refuge on a British 
warship in the James River.
291
 There, he summoned the House of Bur-
gesses to attend upon him; the House unanimously passed a resolution 
declaring this a “high breach of the rights and privileges of this 
House.”
292
 Just under a year later, in June of 1776, the New Jersey Pro-
vincial Congress declared that the proclamation of royal Governor 
William Franklin (illegitimate son of Benjamin) summoning a meeting 
of the General Assembly “ought not to be obeyed” and constituted a 
“direct contempt and violation” of resolutions of the Continental 
Congress.
293
 It immediately stopped Franklin’s salary, and soon after-
wards had him arrested.
294
 With the approval of the Continental Con-
gress, Franklin was sent to Connecticut, where he was held hostage 
until he was exchanged for Governor John McKinly of Delaware, a 
patriot being held by the British.
295
 
In their revolutionary constitutions, a number of states specifical-
ly provided for investigation and contempt powers. The 1776 Pennsyl-
vania Constitution provided for a unicameral legislature with the 
power to “administer oaths or affirmations on examination of wit-
nesses” as well as “all other powers necessary for the legislature of a 
free state or commonwealth.”
296
 The 1777 and 1786 Vermont Constitu-
tions were largely patterned on the Pennsylvania model, and had 
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nearly identical provisions to those quoted above.
297
 Maryland’s 1776 
Constitution had two relevant provisions. First, it gave the House of 
Delegates the power to  
inquire on the oath of witnesses, into all complaints, grievances, 
and offences, as the grand inquest of this State . . . [and to] call for 
all public or official papers and records, and send for persons, 
whom they may judge necessary in the course of their inquiries, 
concerning affairs relating to the public interest.
298
  
Second, both houses of the legislature “may punish, by imprisonment, 
any person who shall be guilty of a contempt in their view . . . by any 
obstruction to their proceedings. They may also punish, by imprison-
ment, any person who shall be guilty of a breach of privilege.”
299
 Geor-
gia’s 1777 Constitution also specifically mentioned the legislature’s 
ability to call executive officers to account.
300
 Massachusetts’s 1780 
Constitution gave both houses of the state legislature the “authority to 
punish by imprisonment every person, not a member, who shall be 
guilty of disrespect to the house, by any disorderly or contemptuous 
behavior in its presence.”
301
 The 1784 New Hampshire Constitution, 
which took the Massachusetts Constitution as a model, had a nearly 
identical provision.
302
 
Other early state constitutions said nothing about a contempt 
power, but were interpreted as implicitly containing such a power. 
South Carolina’s 1776 and 1778 Constitutions both provided that the 
state legislature “shall enjoy all other privileges which have at any 
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Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and Other Organic Laws of the States, Territories, 
and Colonies Now or Heretofore Forming the United States of America 1692 (GPO 1909). 
 299 Md Const of 1776, Art XII (superseded 1851), reprinted in Thorpe, ed, 3 The Federal and 
State Constitutions at 1693 (cited in note 298). 
 300 Ga Const of 1777, Art XLIX (superseded 1789), reprinted in Francis Newton Thorpe, ed, 
2 The Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and Other Organic Laws of the States, 
Territories, and Colonies Now or Heretofore Forming the United States of America 784 (GPO 1909) 
(“Every officer of the State shall be liable to be called to account by the house of assembly.”). 
 301 Mass Const of 1780, Pt 2, ch 1, § 2, Art X, reprinted in Thorpe, 3 The Federal and State 
Constitutions at 1899 (cited in note 298) (providing this power for the House of Representa-
tives); Mass Const of 1780, Pt 2, ch 1, § 2, Art XI (providing the same power for the Senate). 
 302 NH Const of 1784, Pt 2, ¶ 31 (superseded 1792), reprinted in Francis Newton Thorpe, ed, 4 
The Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and Other Organic Laws of the States, Terri-
tories, and Colonies Now or Heretofore Forming the United States of America 2462 (GPO 1909). 
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time been claimed or exercised by the commons house of assembly 
[that is, the South Carolina colonial legislature],”
303
 which, as we have 
seen, included a right to hold executive officers in contempt or breach 
of privilege.
304
 Similarly, the 1777 New York Constitution provided that 
the assembly would “enjoy the same privileges, and proceed in doing 
business in like manner as the assemblies of the colony of New York 
of right formerly did.”
305
 As we have seen, the right to hold the gover-
nor himself in contempt was one of those privileges claimed by the 
New York colonial assembly.
306
 Finally, some states simply had generic 
provisions allowing the legislative houses to determine the rules of 
their own proceedings.
307
 But even those states that merely had a ge-
neric rules-of-proceedings clause understood themselves to have the 
contempt power—and, moreover, understood that power to run 
against executive officials. Thus, in 1781, the Virginia House of Dele-
gates ordered the arrest of a clerk in the Treasury Department upon 
rumors that he had engaged in misconduct.
308
 And in 1786, the Virginia 
House of Delegates had its sergeant arrest Martin Pickett, a county 
sheriff, on the grounds that he had failed to make out a return for del-
egates to the House (that is, that he had failed to report who had won 
an election).
309
 Pickett protested that he had, in fact, made the return; 
after a committee investigated the matter, it determined that he was 
right and released him.
310 
Thus, we see not only that many of the early American state consti-
tutions explicitly gave state legislatures broad contempt powers, but 
also—and more importantly—that even those states that did not expli-
                                                                                                                           
 303 SC Const of 1776, Art VII (superseded 1778), reprinted in Thorpe, 6 The Federal and 
State Constitutions at 3244 (cited in note 297); SC Const of 1778, Art XVI (superseded 1790), 
reprinted in Thorpe, 6 The Federal and State Constitutions at 3252 (cited in note 297). 
 304 See text accompanying note 269. 
 305 NY Const of 1777, Art IX (superseded 1821), reprinted in Thorpe, 5 The Federal and 
State Constitutions at 2631 (cited in note 296). 
 306 See text accompanying notes 277–281. 
 307 See, for example, Del Const of 1776, Art V (superseded 1792), reprinted in Francis New-
ton Thorpe, ed, 1 The Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and Other Organic Laws 
of the States, Territories, and Colonies Now or Heretofore Forming the United States of America 
563 (GPO 1909) (providing that each legislative house could “settle its own rules of proceedings” 
and exercise “all other powers necessary for the legislature of a free and independent State”); Va 
Const of 1776, Art II, ¶ 27 (superseded 1830), reprinted in Francis Newton Thorpe, ed, 7 The 
Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and Other Organic Laws of the States, Territo-
ries, and Colonies Now or Heretofore Forming the United States of America 3816 (GPO 1909) 
(allowing each house to “settle its own rules of proceedings”). 
 308 Potts, 74 U Pa L Rev at 716–17 (cited in note 267).  
 309 Va H of Delegates J 35 (Nov 11, 1786). 
 310 Va H of Delegates J 36 (Nov 13, 1786). 
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citly mention contempt in their constitutions understood their legisla-
tures to have broad contempt powers, even as against state executives. 
IV.  CONTEMPT OF CONGRESS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 
A. Constitutional Text and Structure 
Unlike the congressional houses’ authority to punish their mem-
bers,
311
 their authority to punish nonmembers has no explicit textual 
basis. At the Philadelphia Convention, Charles Pinckney of South 
Carolina proposed a provision reading: “Each House shall be the Judge 
of its own privileges, and shall have authority to punish by imprison-
ment every person violating the same.”
312
 His proposal was committed 
to the Committee of Detail,
313
 where it died without recorded debate. 
No further mention seems to have been made of the houses’ ability to 
punish nonmembers, in either the Philadelphia Convention, the state 
ratifying conventions, or the press. 
The issue was, however, touched upon by several early commenta-
tors on the Constitution. Justice Joseph Story remarked that each 
house’s “power to make rules would be nugatory, unless it was coupled 
with a power to punish for disorderly behavior or disobedience to those 
rules.”
314
 Story found it “remarkable” that the Constitution did not ex-
plicitly mention a power to punish nonmembers, “yet it is obvious that 
unless such a power, to some extent, exists by implication, it is utterly 
impossible for either house to perform its constitutional functions.”
315
 
Story, moreover, concluded that in America, as in Britain, “the legisla-
tive body was the proper and exclusive forum to decide when the con-
tempt existed and when there was a breach of its privileges; and that the 
power to punish followed, as a necessary incident to the power to take 
cognizance of the offence.”
316 The houses’ power to imprison, however, 
is limited to punishment during the legislative session; at the end of a 
session, anyone imprisoned by the house must be released.
317
 Story was 
not the only commentator who thought that, although the Constitu-
tion’s text was silent on the houses’ power to hold nonmembers in 
                                                                                                                           
 311 See US Const Art I, § 5, cl 2 (“Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish 
its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member.”). 
 312 Max Farrand, ed, 2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 341 (Yale 1966).  
 313 Id at 342. 
 314 Joseph Story, 1 Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 837 at 607 (Little, 
Brown 5th ed 1891) (Melville M. Bigelow, ed).  
 315 Id § 845 at 612–13. 
 316 Id § 847 at 615. 
 317 Id § 849 at 621. 
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contempt, sound structural and historical reasoning dictated that such 
a power must exist. Chancellor James Kent likewise noted that such a 
power “was founded on the principle of self preservation.”
318
 Thomas 
Jefferson noted the arguments both for and against such a power and 
declared himself agnostic.
319
 
B. Congressional Practice 
1. Contempt against nonmembers generally. 
From almost the beginning, the houses of Congress have, in fact, 
punished nonmembers. In December 1795, three members of the 
House of Representatives reported that a man named Robert Randall 
had approached them regarding a memorial that he and some asso-
ciates were about to present to the House for a grant of about twenty 
million acres of Western lands.
320
 Randall proposed that “[t]he proper-
ty would be divided into forty shares, twenty-four of which should be 
reserved for such members of Congress as might favor the scheme.”
321
 
Other members reported similar contacts with Randall, as well as with 
an associate of his named Charles Whitney.
322
 Although the matter had 
already been communicated to the executive branch, and, indeed, 
there were reports that Randall was already in the custody of the 
Washington city marshal, the House ordered its sergeant-at-arms to 
take both men into custody, and it appointed a committee to consider 
what to do with them.
323
 After some debate as to the proper mode of 
procedure,
324
 the House finally agreed that the two were to be tried at 
the bar of the House.
325
 Randall was tried first, and, after a three-day 
trial, the House voted seventy-eight to seventeen that Randall “has 
been guilty of a contempt to, and a breach of the privileges of, this 
House, by attempting to corrupt the integrity of its members.”
326
 The 
House additionally resolved that Randall was to be kept in the ser-
geant’s custody “until further order of this House.”
327
 The House re-
                                                                                                                           
 318 James Kent, 1 Commentaries on American Law 221 (Halsted 1826). 
 319 Jefferson, Manual of Parliamentary Practice at 43, 55–57 (cited in note 4).  
 320 5 Annals of Cong 166–67 (Dec 28, 1795). 
 321 Id at 166. 
 322 Id at 168–69.  
 323 5 Annals of Cong 169–70 (Dec 29, 1795). 
 324 See id at 171–94. 
 325 5 Annals of Cong 194–95 (Jan 1, 1796). 
 326 HR J, 4th Cong, 1st Sess 405 (Jan 6, 1796). 
 327 Id at 406. 
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leased him a week later.
328
 Whitney was discharged from custody with-
out any determination of innocence or guilt.
329
 
The early Senate, too, was willing to use its contempt power 
against nonmembers. In March 1800, the Senate resolved that certain 
articles published in a Philadelphia newspaper called the “General 
Advertiser, or Aurora” contained 
assertions and pretended information respecting the Senate and 
the committee of the Senate, and their proceedings, which are 
false, defamatory, scandalous, and malicious, tending to defame 
the Senate of the United States, and to bring them into contempt 
and disrepute, and to excite against them the hatred of the good 
people of the United States; and that the said publication is a 
high breach of the privileges of this House.
330 
The Senate ordered the publisher, William Duane, to attend at the bar 
of the house.
331
 Duane appeared and requested counsel, and his re-
quest was granted.
332
 However, Duane thereafter refused to appear.
333
 
The Senate then voted him guilty of a contempt for this refusal and 
ordered its sergeant to take him into custody.
334
 The sergeant never 
succeeded in doing so, however, and, at the end of the session, the Se-
nate resolved to request the president to prosecute Duane under the 
Sedition Act.
335
 Duane was subsequently convicted and sentenced to 
thirty days’ imprisonment.
336
 Vice President Thomas Jefferson presided 
over the Senate throughout the proceedings.
337
 
It is, thus, clear that both houses of Congress believed from the 
beginning that they had a constitutional power to hold nonmembers 
in contempt.
338
 In 1821, the Supreme Court blessed the practice, as 
well. After the House of Representatives found John Anderson guilty 
of contempt and breach of privilege for attempting to bribe a mem-
                                                                                                                           
 328 HR J, 4th Cong, 1st Sess 414 (Jan 13, 1796). 
 329 HR J, 4th Cong, 1st Sess 407 (Jan 7, 1796). 
 330 Sen J, 6th Cong, 1st Sess 54 (Mar 20, 1800).  
 331 Id. 
 332 Sen J, 6th Cong, 1st Sess 56 (Mar 24, 1800). 
 333 Sen J, 6th Cong, 1st Sess 58 (Mar 26, 1800). 
 334 Sen J, 6th Cong, 1st Sess 60 (Mar 27, 1800). 
 335 Sen J, 6th Cong, 1st Sess 98 (May 14, 1800). 
 336 Eberling, Congressional Investigations at 45 (cited in note 267). 
 337 See, for example, Sen J, 6th Cong, 1st Sess 60–61 (Mar 27, 1800) (reprinting the warrant, 
signed by Jefferson, authorizing the Senate sergeant-at-arms to take Duane into custody). 
 338 It should be noted that the Senate’s use of this power against Duane—as well as some subse-
quent uses of the power by both houses—raises serious First Amendment concerns. But the fact that 
the power can be used in such a way as to violate constitutional rights does not in any way undermine 
the existence of the power when it is used in a way that does not violate constitutional rights. 
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ber,
339
 Anderson sued the sergeant-at-arms for assault and battery and 
false imprisonment.
340
 Justice William Johnson, for a unanimous Su-
preme Court, framed the issue as follows: “whether the House of Rep-
resentatives can take cognisance of contempts committed against 
themselves, under any circumstances?”
341
 His answer was a resounding 
“yes”—the alternative, he wrote, 
obviously leads to the total annihilation of the power of the 
House of Representatives to guard itself from contempts, and 
leaves it exposed to every indignity and interruption that rude-
ness, caprice, or even conspiracy, may meditate against it. This re-
sult is fraught with too much absurdity not to bring into doubt 
the soundness of any argument from which it is derived. That a 
deliberate assembly, clothed with the majesty of the people, and 
charged with the care of all that is dear to them, composed of the 
most distinguished citizens, selected and drawn together from 
every quarter of a great nation, whose deliberations are required 
by public opinion to be conducted under the eye of the public, 
and whose decisions must be clothed with all that sanctity which 
unlimited confidence in their wisdom and purity can inspire, that 
such an assembly should not possess the power to suppress rude-
ness, or repel insult, is a supposition too wild to be suggested.
342 
This structural reasoning was buttressed by historical analysis: the 
Constitution “is not a new creation, but a combination of existing ma-
terials, whose properties and attributes were familiarly understood, 
and had been determined by reiterated experiments.”
343
 That is, the 
experience of the British, colonial, and state legislatures, as well as the 
Continental Congress, implies that, absent some compelling statement 
to the contrary, the privileges of those bodies were meant to be con-
tinued in Congress. But, as with the privileges, so too with the limita-
tions on those privileges: the houses’ power to punish is limited to the 
duration of the session.
344
 
Although subsequent decisions have tinkered with the permissible 
scope of congressional contempt against nonmembers, no subsequent 
                                                                                                                           
 339 HR J, 15th Cong, 1st Sess 154 (Jan 16, 1818).  
 340 Anderson v Dunn, 19 US (6 Wheat) 204, 204 (1821). 
 341 Id at 224–25. 
 342 Id at 228–29. 
 343 Id at 232. 
 344 Anderson, 19 US (6 Wheat) at 231. 
2009] Executive Branch Contempt of Congress 1131 
 
case has doubted its existence.
345
 Thus, both houses of Congress, as well 
as the Supreme Court, have concluded that the structural and historical 
evidence supports an inherent power in each house to hold nonmemb-
ers in contempt. 
2. The contempt statute. 
However, recourse to the inherent contempt power was onerous, 
as it caused the houses to expend valuable time hearing contempt 
proceedings. In 1857, therefore, Congress passed a law providing that 
anyone who refused to obey a congressional subpoena would be cri-
minally liable “in addition to the pains and penalties now existing.”
346
 
Whenever a witness fails to comply with a congressional subpoena, 
the Speaker of the House or President of the Senate can certify the 
matter to the district attorney for the District of Columbia, “whose 
duty it shall be to bring the matter before the grand jury for their ac-
tion.”
347
 The words “in addition to the pains and penalties now exist-
ing” were omitted when the statutory language was reworked in 
1938,
348
 and that is how the law stands today.
349
 
Nothing in the contempt statute, however, evinces any desire to 
eliminate the houses’ inherent contempt powers.
350
 Indeed, given that 
                                                                                                                           
 345 The case law has proceeded in ebbs and flows. The Court’s most narrowly cabined view 
of the contempt power came in Kilbourn v Thompson, 103 US 168 (1881), in which the Court 
struck down a contempt citation against a witness who refused to testify at a hearing regarding 
the loss of federal funds in an investment scheme. The Court determined that such hearings were 
not legislative in nature and were therefore outside of the House’s purview. Id at 192. Subse-
quent decisions again broadened the scope of the houses’ contempt powers. See In re Chapman, 
166 US 661, 672 (1897) (upholding a contempt conviction for refusing to answer questions from 
a committee regarding corruption in the passage of a bill); McGrain v Daugherty, 273 US 135, 
180 (1927) (upholding a contempt citation where a witness refused to testify in front of a com-
mittee seeking information for the purpose of drafting legislation); Jurney v MacCracken, 294 US 
125, 151 (1935) (upholding a contempt citation against a person who allowed papers subpoenaed 
by a Senate committee to be destroyed). With the coming of the McCarthy era, the Court some-
what narrowed the scope of the congressional contempt power. See United States v Rumely, 345 
US 41, 47–48 (1953) (overturning a contempt citation on the grounds that a congressional com-
mittee had exceeded the scope of its authorizing resolution). 
 346 An Act More Effectually to Enforce the Attendance of Witnesses on the Summons of 
Either House of Congress, and to Compel Them to Discover Testimony § 1, ch 19, 11 Stat 155, 
155 (1857). 
 347 Id at § 3. 
 348 Joint Resolution Relating to Congressional Investigations § 102, ch 594, 52 Stat 942, 942 (1938). 
 349 2 USC §§ 192–94.  
 350 See Rosenberg and Tatelman, Congress’s Contempt Power at 21 (cited in note 2) (“It is 
clear from the floor debates and the subsequent practice of both Houses that the legislation was 
intended as an alternative to the inherent contempt power, not as a substitute for it.”). 
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prosecutorial discretion is vested in the executive branch,
351
 any at-
tempt to eliminate the houses’ inherent contempt powers would have 
represented a significant diminution in congressional power—in es-
sence, it would have limited the houses’ power to investigate to those 
topics the executive wished to have investigated.
352
 Even assuming ar-
guendo that Congress could surrender its constitutional powers in this 
way, we should not presume that it has, in fact, done so, absent some 
compelling evidence. 
This is, of course, an especially important point because the execu-
tive is most likely to decline to prosecute precisely when the alleged 
contemnor is a member of the executive branch.
353
 Indeed, as we have 
seen, the president declined to prosecute Harriet Miers and Joshua Bol-
ten.
354
 We now turn, therefore, to an analysis of how the houses of Con-
gress have treated contempt by members of the executive branch.  
3. Contempt proceedings against executive branch officers. 
Fortunately for the stability of our government, most disputes be-
tween the executive and legislative branches over information have 
historically been settled by negotiation and accommodation.
355
 There 
have, however, been moments when this arrangement has broken 
                                                                                                                           
 351 See US Const Art II, § 3 (“[The president] shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed.”). See also United States v Cox, 342 F2d 167, 171 (5th Cir 1965) (en banc) (holding that 
a federal judge may not compel a federal prosecutor to prosecute a case). 
 352 As Allen Moreland put it,  
The investigative power of Congress is intimately related to its power to punish for con-
tempt. In practical terms, the inquisitorial authority of the Congress ends at the point where 
a witness will be excused by the courts for refusing to obey a congressional summons to ap-
pear or to produce papers, or for refusing to answer questions posed by a member or com-
mittee of Congress.  
Allen B. Moreland, Congressional Investigations and Private Persons, 40 S Cal L Rev 189, 189 
(1967). Obviously, this holds not only where the courts will excuse the witness for refusing to 
comply with the subpoena, but also where the only competent prosecutorial authority refuses to 
prosecute the witness. 
 Moreover, even if the executive branch could be forced to prosecute against its will, it could 
hardly be forced to do a good job. A prosecutor who wants a grand jury to return a no bill or 
who wants a petit jury to acquit can surely find some way of accomplishing that objective. 
 353 Indeed, the executive branch takes the position that the criminal contempt statute does 
not apply to members of the executive branch, as a matter of both statutory and constitutional 
interpretation. See Olson, OLC Memo at 129–42 (cited in note 34) (noting that “the contempt of 
Congress statute does not require . . . prosecution of [an executive branch] official”). 
 354 See text accompanying notes 18–22. 
 355 Irving Younger has catalogued a number of such cases. See Irving Younger, Congres-
sional Investigations and Executive Secrecy: A Study in the Separation of Powers, 20 U Pitt L Rev 
755, 756–69 (1959). 
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down and a house of Congress has resorted to the use of its contempt 
powers against executive officers. 
On March 28, 1834, in response to President Andrew Jackson’s 
removal of federal money from the Second Bank of the United States 
and deposit of that money into state banks,
356
 the Senate adopted a 
resolution proclaiming that “the President, in the late Executive pro-
ceedings in relation to the public revenue, has assumed upon himself 
authority and power not conferred by the constitution and laws, but in 
derogation of both.”
357
 Jackson replied with a lengthy message of pro-
test.
358
 He insisted that the only constitutional checks on the presiden-
cy were impeachment, criminal trial, civil suit, and public opinion—as 
the Senate’s resolution was none of the above, he insisted that the Se-
nate resolution was “wholly unauthorized by the constitution, and in 
derogation of its entire spirit.”
359
 The Senate was not amused at having 
its own words thrown back in its face. After some debate, it passed a 
series of resolutions asserting that the president had overstepped his 
constitutional authority and usurped powers belonging to Congress, 
that he had no right to make formal protests against votes or proceed-
ings in a house of Congress, and that his protest constituted “a breach 
of the privileges of the Senate.”
360
 (In 1837, as Jackson was on his way 
out of office and after his Democratic Party had picked up seats in the 
Senate, the resolution censuring him was officially “expunged” from 
the Senate Journal.
361
) 
Several years later, the House borrowed the Senate’s language to 
determine that another president had breached legislative privilege. 
On August 9, 1842, President John Tyler vetoed a tariff and land dis-
tribution bill.
362
 The next day, the House created a select committee to 
consider the president’s objections.
363
 The committee, chaired by John 
                                                                                                                           
 356 See 10 Reg Deb 1185–87 (Mar 28, 1834) (Senator Gabriel Moore) (explaining his rea-
soning for voting for the resolutions). The Bank’s charter was due to expire in 1836, and Jackson 
had already, in 1832, vetoed a bill to renew the charter. He sought to kill the Bank off even earli-
er by removing all federal deposits in 1834. See generally Bray Hammond, Jackson, Biddle, and 
the Bank of the United States, 7 J Econ Hist 1 (1947). 
 357 Sen J, 23d Cong, 1st Sess 197 (Mar 28, 1834).  
 358 See 10 Reg Deb 1317–36 (Apr 17, 1834). 
 359 Id at 1318.  
 360 Sen J, 23d Cong, 1st Sess 252–53 (May 7, 1834).  
 361 Sen J, 24th Cong, 2d Sess 123–24 (Jan 16, 1837). See David P. Currie, The Constitution in 
Congress: Democrats and Whigs, 1829–1861 73–75 (Chicago 2005) (describing the debate over 
expunging the Senate Journal). 
 362 HR J, 27th Cong, 2d Sess 1242–47 (Aug 9, 1842). 
 363 HR J, 27th Cong, 2d Sess 1254 (Aug 10, 1842). 
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Quincy Adams, returned with a scathing report,
364
 which began by re-
ferring to the veto message as “the last of a series of executive meas-
ures, the result of which has been to defeat and nullify the whole ac-
tion of the legislative authority of this Union, upon the most impor-
tant interests of the nation,”
365
 and got more combative from there. The 
report ended by recommending a constitutional amendment that 
would allow Congress to override a presidential veto by a bare majori-
ty.
366
 President Tyler replied with a protest message,
367
 complaining that 
the House’s report charged him with serious offenses without giving 
him the opportunity to defend himself.
368
 The House then resolved that 
the president had no right to make a protest against its votes or pro-
ceedings, and that the protest message constituted a “breach of the 
privileges of this House.”
369
 
It was not just presidents themselves who were found to have 
breached congressional privilege. In 1866, Representative James 
Blaine laid before the House a letter from James Fry, the Provost 
Marshal General of the Army.
370
 The letter was a response to a speech 
made several days earlier by Representative Roscoe Conkling, in 
which he had referred to Fry as “an undeserving public servant” and 
asserted that, during the Civil War, the Provost Marshal General’s 
office had “turned the business of recruiting and drafting into one 
carnival of corrupt disorder, into a paradise of coxcombs and 
thieves.”
371
 In response, Fry wrote, inter alia, that the enmity between 
Conkling and himself “arose altogether from my unwillingness to gra-
tify him in certain matters in which he had a strong personal interest. 
It is true, also, that he was foiled in his efforts to obtain undue conces-
sions from my bureau, and to discredit me in the eyes of my supe-
riors.”
372
 After the letter was read, the House created a select commit-
tee to inquire into the matter.
373
 The committee reported back two res-
olutions, which were overwhelmingly adopted by the House. The first 
                                                                                                                           
 364 Cong Globe, 27th Cong, 2d Sess 894–96 (Aug 16, 1842).  
 365 Id at 894. 
 366 Id at 896.  
 367 John Tyler, Protest (Aug 30, 1842), reprinted in James D. Richardson, ed, 4 A Compila-
tion of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1797–1897 190 (GPO 1897). 
 368 Id at 191–92.  
 369 HR J, 27th Cong, 2d Sess 1464 (Aug 30, 1842).  
 370 Cong Globe, 39th Cong, 1st Sess 2292–93 (Apr 30, 1866).  
 371 Cong Globe, 39th Cong, 1st Sess 2151 (Apr 24, 1866) (reporting a statement of Repre-
sentative Conkling). 
 372 Cong Globe, 39th Cong, 1st Sess 2293 (Apr 30, 1866). 
 373 HR J, 39th Cong, 1st Sess 639 (Apr 30, 1866).  
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proclaimed that Fry’s allegations of corruption by Conkling were 
“wholly without foundation in truth.”
374
 The second determined that 
General Fry, an officer of the government of the United States, 
and head of one of its military bureaus, in writing and publishing 
these accusations . . . and which, owing to the crimes and wrongs 
which they impute to a member of this body, are of a nature 
deeply injurious to the official and personal character, influence, 
and privileges of such member, and their publication originating, 
as in the judgment of the House they did, in no misapprehension 
of facts, but in the resentment and passion of their author, was 
guilty of a gross violation of the privileges of such member and of 
this house, and his conduct in that regard merits and receives its 
unqualified disapprobation.
375 
The Provost Marshal General’s Bureau was abolished the next month.
376
 
In 1879, the House of Representatives actually had its sergeant 
take an executive branch officer into custody for contempt. In 1878, 
the House resolved that its Committee on Expenditures in the State 
Department was empowered to investigate the past and present busi-
ness of that department. The resolution specifically authorized the 
committee “to send for papers and persons.”
377
 Soon thereafter, the 
committee received a communication from John C. Myers, a former 
consul-general to Shanghai, alleging that George F. Seward,
378
 then the 
Minister to China, was guilty of malfeasance during his time as 
Shanghai consul-general.
379
 The committee determined that certain 
books that “contained original entries of fees received at the consulate 
at Shanghai from the year 1863 to 1871, had not been transmitted to 
the State Department,” but had rather been taken with Seward when 
he moved to Peking.
380
 The committee believed that the books were 
“necessary to a thorough and complete investigation of the receipts 
                                                                                                                           
 374 HR J, 39th Cong, 1st Sess 1056–57 (Jul 19, 1866). 
 375 Id at 1057. 
 376 An Act to Increase and Fix the Military Peace Establishment of the United States § 33, 
ch 299, 14 Stat 332, 337 (1866) (ordering the closure of the Provost Marshal General’s Bureau 
within thirty days). 
 377 8 Cong Rec H 1771 (Feb 22, 1879) (reprinting the committee’s report, including its au-
thorizing resolution).  
 378 Seward also happened to be the nephew of Secretary of State William H. Seward. For an 
overview of Seward’s career—albeit one that omits all mention of his tussles with the House—
see generally Paul Hibbert Clyde, Attitudes and Policies of George F. Seward, American Minister 
at Peking, 1876–1880, 2 Pac Hist Rev 387 (1933).  
 379 8 Cong Rec H 1771 (Feb 22, 1879). 
 380 Id. 
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and expenditures at the Shanghai consulate.”
381
 Myers, who succeeded 
Seward in Shanghai, alleged in an affidavit to the committee that the 
books would show that Seward had misappropriated large sums of 
money from the consulate.
382
 
On February 19, 1879, the committee subpoenaed Seward both to 
appear and to bring the books with him.
383
 Seward, who had returned 
from China for the hearings, appeared the next day; his counsel ar-
gued that the committee had no authority to compel production of the 
books.
384
 In response, the committee adopted a number of resolutions 
asserting that the books were public property and that Seward had no 
right to withhold them from the committee.
385
 In response to the com-
mittee’s renewed demands for Seward either to produce the books or 
to testify as to their contents, Seward’s counsel asserted that such de-
mands violated Seward’s right against compelled self-incrimination.
386
 
The committee did not accept this argument, asserting that “an inves-
tigation before a congressional committee is not a criminal case, with-
in the meaning of the Constitution.”
387
 The committee accordingly rec-
ommended that the sergeant be ordered to  
take into custody forthwith, wherever to be found, the body of 
George F. Seward and him bring to the bar of the House, to show 
cause why he should not be punished for contempt; and in the 
meantime keep the said George F. Seward in his custody to abide 
the further order of the House.
388
  
On February 27, the House adopted the committee’s proposed order 
by a vote of 105 to 47.
389
 
On February 28, the sergeant brought Seward to the bar of the 
House. In response to the Speaker’s inquiring whether he was ready 
to cooperate, Seward presented a written statement contending that 
the committee’s investigation was leading to impeachment charges, 
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and that he therefore had a right not to be a witness against himself.
390
 
The House voted to commit his reply to the Judiciary Committee, and 
he was released on his own recognizance while that committee delibe-
rated.
391
 On March 1, the Committee on Expenditures in the State De-
partment reported articles of impeachment against Seward.
392
 The ses-
sion ended two days later, without a vote on the impeachment articles. 
On the final day of the session, the Judiciary Committee reported that 
Seward should not be compelled to incriminate himself when there 
were ongoing impeachment proceedings against him.
393
 That report 
was never voted on by the House. 
The House again arrested an executive branch official in 1916. In 
December 1915, Representative Frank Buchanan accused United 
States District Attorney for the Southern District of New York H. 
Snowden Marshall of high crimes and misdemeanors. Two weeks later, 
a federal grand jury convened by Marshall indicted Buchanan for vi-
olations of the Sherman Antitrust Act.
394
 Buchanan then introduced a 
resolution calling for the appointment of a committee to investigate 
alleged misconduct by Marshall; on February 1, 1916, a subcommittee 
of the Judiciary Committee was appointed for this task.
395
 While the 
subcommittee was investigating, an article appeared in a newspaper 
accusing the subcommittee of attempting to frustrate the grand jury 
investigation.
396
 When the reporter refused to name his sources to the 
subcommittee, he was threatened with contempt proceedings.
397
 At 
that point, Marshall wrote a letter to the subcommittee acknowledg-
ing that he was the source for the article; the letter went on to restate 
the charges in language that the Supreme Court described as “certain-
ly unparliamentary and manifestly ill-tempered, and which was well 
calculated to arouse the indignation not only of the members of the 
subcommittee, but of those of the House generally.”
398
 Marshall also 
released the letter to the press.
399
 The House then adopted a resolution 
declaring the letter “defamatory and insulting” and asserting that it 
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“tends to bring the House into public contempt and ridicule, and that 
the said H. Snowden Marshall, by writing and publishing the same, is 
guilty of contempt of the House of Representatives of the United 
States because of the violating of its privileges, its honor, and its digni-
ty.”
400
 The sergeant-at-arms was dispatched to New York to arrest Mar-
shall.
401
 
Marshall’s habeas petition was denied by Judge Learned Hand.
402
 
The Supreme Court reversed; however, its reasons for reversal are 
crucial. The Court had no doubt that the House possessed “a power 
implied to deal with contempt in so far as that authority was necessary 
to preserve and carry out the legislative authority given” in the Con-
stitution.
403
 And the Court did not even find it necessary to consider 
whether the scope of the contempt power was different when applied 
to executive branch officials—it simply treated as given that the pow-
er extended to them. Rather, the Court ordered Marshall released 
from custody because 
the contempt was deemed to result from the writing of the letter, 
not because of any obstruction to the performance of legislative 
duty resulting from the letter, or because the preservation of the 
power of the House to carry out its legislative authority was en-
dangered by its writing, but because of the effect and operation 
which the irritating and ill-tempered statements made in the let-
ter would produce upon the public mind, or because of the sense 
of indignation which it may be assumed was produced by the let-
ter upon the members of the committee and of the House gener-
ally. But to state this situation is to demonstrate that the con-
tempt relied upon was not intrinsic to the right of the House to 
preserve the means of discharging its legislative duties, but was 
extrinsic to the discharge of such duties, and related only to the 
presumed operation which the letter might have upon the public 
mind and the indignation naturally felt by members of the com-
mittee on the subject. But these considerations plainly serve to 
mark the broad boundary line which separates the limited im-
plied power to deal with classes of acts as contempts for self-
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preservation and the comprehensive legislative power to provide 
by law for punishment for wrongful acts.
404 
That is, the House would have had full power to punish Marshall for 
obstructing its proceedings; however, the Court said, this contempt 
power does not extend to mere dignitary offenses that do not affect 
the House’s proceedings. Neither the House nor the Court seemed to 
have any doubt that the House could arrest and hold a federal prose-
cutor for actions which were truly within the scope of Congress’s con-
tempt power, rightly construed. 
The Watergate scandal again brought to the fore clashes between 
the executive and legislative branches over the scope of the latter’s 
contempt power. In 1973, the Senate Select Committee on Campaign 
Activities demanded five tapes of White House conversations be-
tween President Richard Nixon and presidential advisor John Dean.
405
 
When Nixon, asserting executive privilege, refused to turn the tapes 
over, the committee went to court, seeking a declaratory judgment 
that it had a right to the tapes and an injunction ordering Nixon to 
turn them over.
406
 The district court dispatched with justiciability con-
cerns in a brief paragraph, noting that the DC Circuit had recently 
held that an assertion of executive privilege as against a grand jury 
subpoena was justiciable,
407
 and insisting that the reasoning in that case 
“is equally applicable to the subpoena of a congressional commit-
tee.”
408
 The court then proceeded to balance the public interest in the 
president’s privilege claim against the public interest in disclosure to 
the committee, and it determined that “[i]t has not been demonstrated 
to the Court’s satisfaction” that the latter outweighed the former.
409
 
The court was especially concerned that disclosure of the tapes might 
harm “the integrity of the criminal trials arising out of Watergate.”
410
 
Noting that the tapes were available to the grand juries investigating 
Watergate, the court concluded that “[t]o suggest that at this juncture 
the public interest requires pretrial disclosure of these tapes either to 
the Committee or to the public is to imply that the judicial process has 
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not been or will not be effective in this matter.”
411
 The court according-
ly dismissed the complaint.
412
 
The DC Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed.
413
 It did not discuss the 
issue of justiciability at all. Instead, noting that presidential conversa-
tions are “presumptively privileged,”
414
 the court claimed that the 
committee had shown no interest sufficiently compelling so as to de-
feat the presumption.
415
 The court reasoned that because the House 
Judiciary Committee, which was considering articles of impeachment, 
already had the tapes, the Select Committee’s need for them was 
“merely cumulative.”
416
 And, the court suggested, any potential legisla-
tive use the committee had for the tapes was of a lesser weight than a 
grand jury’s need for the tapes (which the court had previously upheld 
against an assertion of executive privilege).
417
 Two months after the DC 
Circuit’s opinion, the Supreme Court unanimously ordered the tapes to 
be turned over to the district court in which White House officials were 
being tried for their involvement in Watergate.
418
 Within days of that 
decision, the House Judiciary Committee adopted articles of impeach-
ment against Nixon,
419
 and he resigned less than two weeks later. 
In the years after Nixon’s resignation, a number of cabinet offic-
ers and other high-ranking executive branch officials have been held 
in contempt of Congress, but those disputes have generally ended in 
disclosure of the requested information before any punitive measures 
were taken.
420
 The case that came closest to outright confrontation was 
the result of an investigation by the House Committee on Public 
Works and Transportation into the Environmental Protection Agen-
cy’s (EPA) administration of the Superfund scheme.
421
 In 1982, the 
Public Works Committee’s Subcommittee on Investigations and Over-
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sight served a subpoena on EPA Administrator Anne Gorsuch seek-
ing a number of documents related to EPA’s treatment of certain Su-
perfund sites.
422
 On President Ronald Reagan’s instructions, Gorsuch 
withheld certain documents related to ongoing enforcement actions, 
asserting that they were privileged.
423
 The committee referred the mat-
ter to the full House, which cited Gorsuch for contempt on Decem-
ber 16, 1982.
424
 That same day, Gorsuch brought an action seeking a 
declaratory judgment that she had acted lawfully in withholding the 
documents.
425
 The next day, the Speaker certified the matter to the 
United States Attorney for prosecution under the 1857 criminal con-
tempt statute;
426
 the United States Attorney refused to prosecute so 
long as the civil suit was pending.
427
 
The district court opted for a course of judicial modesty and ex-
ercised its discretion under the Declaratory Judgment Act not to hear 
the case.
428
 Arguing that “judicial intervention should be delayed until 
all possibilities for settlement have been exhausted,”
429
 the court found 
that there was still an opportunity for the parties to compromise.
430
 
Shortly thereafter, the parties did just that: they reached an agreement 
under which the House withdrew the contempt citation and EPA 
granted the subcommittee limited access to the documents.
431
 Thereafter, 
the United States Attorney presented the contempt citation to a grand 
jury, which unanimously returned a no bill.
432
 Gorsuch resigned a little 
over a month after the district court’s decision not to hear the civil case, 
and before the agreement with the subcommittee was reached.
433
 
The Gorsuch controversy also occasioned the executive branch’s 
most extensive meditations on the interplay between congressional 
contempt and executive privilege, in the form of two Office of Legal 
Counsel (OLC) memos. A 1984 memo authored by Theodore Olson 
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concluded that the executive branch could properly exercise its discre-
tion not to prosecute under the criminal contempt statute;
434
 it also 
concluded that the criminal contempt statute did not apply at all to 
executive branch officials asserting executive privilege.
435
 In support of 
this latter proposition, it offered some brief snippets of evidence from 
the legislative history of the criminal contempt statute,
436
 but it placed 
primary emphasis on a separation of powers argument: “[I]f executive 
officials were subject to prosecution for criminal contempt whenever 
they carried out the President’s claim of executive privilege, it would 
significantly burden and immeasurably impair the President’s ability 
to fulfill his constitutional duties.”
437
 This is because it would put the 
president in the position of either placing one of his subordinates at 
risk of going to prison or surrendering his ability to make executive 
privilege arguments, even when he thought they were necessary to the 
performance of his constitutional role.
438
 Olson, instead, argued that 
Congress should file civil suits to enforce its subpoenas.
439
 He also in-
sisted that Congress “has never arrested an executive official for con-
tempt of Congress for failing to produce subpoenaed documents.”
440
 
As we have seen, this is incorrect—the House arrested George Se-
ward for precisely that reason
441
—but Olson is hardly the only com-
mentator to have overlooked the Seward case.
442
 A 1986 OLC memo, 
authored by Charles Cooper, concurred that the criminal contempt 
statute was inapplicable,
443
 but went further in asserting that Con-
gress’s inherent contempt power might be inapplicable against an ex-
ecutive branch official, as well.
444
 Aside from general claims about the 
unlikeliness of a house of Congress sending its sergeant-at-arms to 
arrest an executive branch official and the Supreme Court’s recent 
skepticism about congressional power in other contexts, the memo 
offers very little reasoning for this point. According to the Cooper 
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memo, then, Congress’s only remedy for contempt by a member of the 
executive branch is a civil suit.
445
 
We have, thus, seen all three branches weigh in with their interpre-
tations of Congress’s ability to hold executive branch officers in con-
tempt. Congress itself has spoken through its various contempt pro-
ceedings, against both presidents themselves (Jackson, Tyler, and Nixon) 
and their subordinates (Fry, Seward, Marshall, and Gorsuch). The execu-
tive branch has spoken, both through its reaction to these proceedings 
and through its two OLC Memos. And finally, the courts have spoken, in 
cases arising out of the Marshall, Nixon, and Gorsuch controversies. 
V.  LESSONS LEARNED  
To what, then, does all of this amount? In this Part, I first draw 
some general principles from the historical treatment presented above 
and then apply those lessons to the Miers case. 
A. General Principles 
1. Congressional findings of contempt against nonmembers. 
Although there is no explicit textual basis for the authority of the 
houses of Congress to hold a nonmember in contempt of Congress or 
breach of privilege, this authority is amply justified on historical, struc-
tural, and precedential grounds. Historically, as we have seen, Anglo-
American legislatures have exercised a power to punish nonmembers 
since the sixteenth century.
446
 This power crossed the Atlantic and was 
widely used in the American colonies and states prior to the drafting 
of the federal Constitution. Perhaps most importantly, even in those 
states whose constitutions did not explicitly grant their legislatures the 
power to hold nonmembers in contempt, in fact, the legislatures did 
exercise this power.
447
 It thus seems reasonable to conclude that such a 
power was considered inherent in what it meant to be a legislature—
or, to give it a more concrete textual grounding, that such a power was 
understood to fall within each house’s authority to “determine the 
Rules of its Proceedings.”
448
 
This feeds into the structural rationale: for Congress to be able ef-
fectively to perform any of its functions—ranging from legislating, to 
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overseeing administrative agencies, to impeaching, to judging the elec-
tions, returns, and qualifications of its members—it must have access 
to information.
449
 If those in possession of the necessary information 
could not be made to give it up, then Congress would have at its dis-
posal only the information that witnesses wanted it to have—hardly 
an effective means of carrying out its functions. Indeed, if it is essential 
that courts have the power to compel testimony and evidence in order 
to render justice in particular cases, then it must be at least as essential 
for the houses of Congress to have this power when they are exercising 
their quasi-judicial functions (for example, impeachment and judging 
the elections, returns, and qualifications of members) and perhaps even 
more important when they seek to create laws to apply across the entire 
nation. Although “the public” in Lord Hardwicke’s famous maxim that 
“the public . . . has a right to every man’s evidence”
450
 is frequently used 
to refer to courts,
451
 it applies at least as well to Congress.
452
 This was pre-
cisely the structural reasoning appealed to by Story
453
 and Kent.
454
 
Finally, there is the precedential rationale for this power. As we 
have seen, Congress itself has exercised the power from the earliest 
years of the Republic.
455
 The judiciary has blessed the practice, as well.
456
 
And the executive branch has recognized the power in its two OLC 
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memos.
457
 The right of each house of Congress to hold nonmembers in 
contempt has thus been recognized by all three branches of the feder-
al government. 
2. Contempt findings against executive branch officials. 
The case for an inherent contempt authority is, if anything, 
stronger in the case of executive branch officials than in that of ordi-
nary citizens. As we have seen, parliaments used contempt and breach 
of privilege findings against monarchs to assert their authority as early 
as Elizabeth’s reign.
458
 When Charles I tried to dispense with Parlia-
ment and rule by royal prerogative alone, it was, among other things, a 
claim of breach of privilege and contempt of Parliament that drove 
him from his throne.
459
 It was, in many cases, such claims that the 
American colonists used to keep their royal governors in line,
460
 and 
that the states used to cabin executive power in the early Republic.
461
 
With these precedents in mind, and with no available evidence to the 
contrary, it seems reasonable to assume that the Founders understood 
Congress to have the authority to hold executive branch officers in 
contempt. And this understanding is further buttressed by the use of 
contempt proceedings against executive branch officials—including 
presidents themselves—numerous times in our nation’s history.
462
 
This historical evidence is underscored by structural considera-
tions. First, Congress has special oversight authority over the workings 
of the executive branch. The entire federal budget, after all, flows from 
Congress, and specific congressional committees are charged with 
oversight of specific departments and administrative agencies. At the 
extreme, Congress has the power to impeach executive branch offic-
ers. This special oversight power makes it all the more important that 
Congress have access to accurate information about the workings of 
the executive branch. And in order for this oversight power to be ef-
fective in rooting out executive branch malevolence and incompe-
tence, Congress must have access to precisely that information that 
the executive does not wish to turn over—that is, it must have the 
power to hold executive branch officials in contempt.  
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Moreover, this contempt authority must be distinct from the 
criminal law. As we have seen, the executive branch cannot constitu-
tionally be compelled to prosecute.
463
 As the president is unlikely to 
authorize one of his subordinates (the United States Attorney) to file 
charges against another of his subordinates who was acting according 
to his orders, it is safe to assume that the executive branch will gener-
ally decline to prosecute an executive branch official for criminal con-
tempt of Congress. It is thus all the more necessary that Congress have 
an inherent contempt power against executive branch officers. 
3. Defiance of a congressional subpoena as contempt of Congress. 
Whatever the limits of Congress’s contempt power, it should be 
clear that defiance of a subpoena qualifies as contempt. If the con-
tempt power is justified by the structural necessity of Congress’s effec-
tive functioning, and if the effective functioning of Congress requires 
that Congress be able to acquire information, even from unwilling 
sources, then it is clear that refusing to turn over information subpoe-
naed by Congress is appropriately punishable as contempt. Although 
the analogy between contempt of Congress and contempt of court is 
not perfect, it is, of course, the case that an unexcused failure to comp-
ly with a subpoena is grounds for a finding of contempt of court.
464
 
4. Enforcement of a congressional contempt citation against an 
executive branch official. 
If Congress may use its inherent contempt power to hold an ex-
ecutive branch officer in contempt, and if defiance of a subpoena may 
properly be treated as contempt, then how should Congress proceed 
against that official? We have already seen that criminal proceedings 
are unlikely to be available. Should Congress file a civil suit, or should it 
use other means? The question is one of institutional power: executive 
branch officials are likely to make a defense to contempt charges—
for example, that their refusal to produce documents should be ex-
cused because it was pursuant to a proper invocation of executive 
privilege. Who, then, is the final judge of whether the invocation of 
executive privilege was proper: the house of Congress, or the courts? 
Until the late twentieth century, the answer was clear: the legisla-
tive house is the final judge of legislative contempts. Certainly, neither 
the houses of Parliament nor the British monarchs ever considered 
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submitting their disputes to the courts. The same was true of the co-
lonial and early state legislatures, and, indeed, of the houses of Con-
gress in their disputes with Jackson, Tyler, Fry, and Seward. The reason 
is both very simple and very important: these were disputes over the 
relative balance of executive and legislative power. Each side was con-
tending for more power vis-à-vis the other. To invoke the aid of a third 
party is to admit weakness—to admit that one’s own authority is in-
sufficient to get what one wants. This is why it is so important to view 
the disputes between executive authority and legislative contempt 
powers in their broader historical and political context: these disputes 
are, at their heart, about the basic contours of the constitutional divi-
sion of powers. 
When Elizabeth and James I ordered Parliament not to discuss 
certain topics, they were asserting that there were areas of national 
policy in which Parliament could have no say. In asserting a privilege 
of unfettered speech and debate—and then asserting that the mo-
narch had breached that privilege—Parliament reasserted its institu-
tional authority. When Charles I attempted to collect taxes despite 
Parliament’s refusal to grant them to him, when he attempted to with-
hold royal records and officials from Parliament, when he refused to 
justify his imprisonment of Arundel, when he seized John Rolle’s goods 
and attempted to extort a grant of supply in exchange for their return, 
and when, after governing without Parliament for over a decade, he 
accused members of treason and brought an armed guard into the 
House of Commons to arrest them, he was asserting in the most stri-
dent terms an absolutist constitutional vision. When the houses reacted 
against this vision with repeated findings that he breached privilege, 
when they refused to proceed to other business until he redressed their 
grievances, when they authorized armed disobedience to breaches of 
privilege, and when, ultimately, they rebelled, deposed, tried, and ex-
ecuted Charles, the houses insisted upon a different understanding of 
the constitutional division of powers. And this insistence came in the 
language of breach of privilege and contempt of Parliament. 
These clashes, of course, were not limited to the Old World. When 
the colonial legislatures wanted to ensure that governors and other 
officials appointed in London paid attention to the local concerns that 
the legislatures represented, they were not shy about using their con-
tempt powers. And they had a number of means at their disposal for 
enforcing their contempt findings, ranging from censure to arrest to 
the withholding of salary. Recognizing the importance of this tool, a 
number of state constitutions written in the years between indepen-
dence and the drafting of the federal Constitution explicitly provided 
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the legislature with the power to hold executive officials in contempt. 
But even in those states whose constitutions did not explicitly provide 
for such a power, the legislature understood the power to exist, and 
made use of it. 
And, finally, we have seen the houses of Congress make use of 
the contempt power in the context of disputes with the executive 
branch. The Senate used it in the context of a dispute with Andrew 
Jackson—our first “imperial president”
465
—and the House used it in 
the context of disputes with John Tyler, James Fry, George Seward, 
and H. Snowden Marshall. Until Watergate, the courts never inquired 
into a contempt judgment against an executive branch official that the 
house of Congress was jurisdictionally competent to make. 
It is true that the Supreme Court held that the House had impro-
perly imprisoned Marshall.
466
 But that is best thought of as a ruling on 
the scope of the House’s jurisdiction rather than a ruling on the merits. 
That is, the House could punish Marshall for obstructing its proceed-
ings, and the Court never suggested that it would review a determina-
tion by the House that someone had, in fact, obstructed its proceedings. 
But the House did not purport to make that claim; rather, it punished 
Marshall for a mere dignitary offense, and that, the Court said, was out-
side of the House’s power to punish for contempt. (In this regard, Mar-
shall may be thought of as analogous to Powell v McCormack,
467
 in 
which the Court held that the House could not add qualifications for a 
member of Congress
468
 but never suggested that it would review a de-
termination by the House on the merits—for example, a determination 
that a claimant was, in fact, under twenty-five years of age.
469
) 
                                                                                                                           
 465 See Amar, America’s Constitution at 175 (cited in note 288) (reprinting an 1833 cartoon 
referring to Jackson as “King Andrew the First” and showing him trampling on the Constitution 
while holding a veto message in his hand). 
 466 Marshall v Gordon, 243 US 521, 548 (1917) (granting Marshall’s habeas petition and 
ordering his discharge from custody). See also text accompanying notes 403–404.  
  467  395 US 486 (1969). 
 468 Id at 521–48. 
 469 See id at 521 n 42 (“[F]ederal courts might still be barred by the political question doc-
trine from reviewing the House’s factual determination that a member did not meet one of the 
standing qualifications. This is an issue not presented in this case and we express no view as to its 
resolution.”); id at 548 (“Art. I, § 5, is at most a ‘textually demonstrable commitment’ to Congress 
to judge only the qualifications expressly set forth in the Constitution.”) (citation omitted). For 
an argument that a judgment by a house of Congress on the merits of a qualifications claim 
would be nonjusticiable, see Chafetz, Democracy’s Privileged Few at 55–56 (cited in note 53) 
(“The Court nowhere suggests [in Powell] that it could review the content of an exclusion deci-
sion.”); Akhil Reed Amar and Josh Chafetz, How the Senate Can Stop Blagojevich, Slate (Dec 31, 
2008), online at http://www.slate.com/id/2207754 (visited Sept 1, 2009). 
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Indeed, it was not until Watergate that the courts purported to 
determine the merits of a contempt claim against an executive branch 
official,
470
 and those cases illustrate all of the reasons why the courts 
should not involve themselves in such disputes. Courts are (unsurpri-
singly) inclined to take a court-centric view of the world. Thus, al-
though courts were happy to order Nixon to turn the tapes over to 
courts,
471
 they found that congressional committees had a lesser inter-
est in the tapes, an interest that was outweighed by the president’s 
privilege claims.
472
 Indeed, both the district court and the court of ap-
peals thought that Congress had less need for the tapes than the 
courts did,
473
 and the district court even worried that turning the tapes 
over to Congress might harm ongoing grand jury investigations
474
—as 
if no higher interest than protecting the integrity of grand jury pro-
ceedings was conceivable. The court of appeals suggested that its un-
derstanding of congressional procedure was superior to that of the 
committee, dismissing the committee’s need for the tapes as “merely 
cumulative,” since another congressional committee already had the 
tapes.
475
 The court of appeals did not consider the issue of justiciability 
at all, and the district court simply held that, because a claim of execu-
tive privilege in resistance to a grand jury subpoena is justiciable, so 
must be a claim of executive privilege in resistance to a congressional 
subpoena.
476
 This is fatuous—in holding that an executive privilege 
claim in defiance of a grand jury subpoena is justiciable, a court is es-
sentially saying, “We, the branch that issued the subpoena, will not 
give you, the executive branch, carte blanche to defy it, but we will 
hear you out as to your reasons for defying it.” The analogue in the 
                                                                                                                           
 470 In Kilbourn v Thompson, 103 US 168 (1881), the Supreme Court did undertake a prob-
ing and skeptical review of a congressional contempt citation against a private citizen. Even 
there, however, the Court phrased its holding in jurisdictional language. See id at 190 (holding 
that the House of Representatives had no jurisdiction to inquire into Kilbourn’s “private af-
fairs”). The Court soon moved away from this narrow interpretation. See Chafetz, Democracy’s 
Privileged Few at 231–33 (cited in note 53). Elsewhere, I have criticized the Kilbourn holding as 
overly narrow. See id at 229–30. Even within the Kilbourn framework, however, it is clear that 
Congress would be jurisdictionally competent to hold executive branch officials in contempt for 
defying subpoenas related to their official duties. 
 471 See United States v Nixon, 418 US 683, 712 (1974); Nixon v Sirica, 487 F2d 700, 712 (DC Cir 
1973).  
 472 Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v Nixon, 498 F2d 725, 732 
(DC Cir 1974); Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v Nixon, 370 F Supp 
521, 522–23 (DDC 1974).  
 473 Senate Select Committee, 498 F2d at 732; Senate Select Committee, 370 F Supp at 523–24. 
 474 Senate Select Committee, 370 F Supp at 523–24. 
 475 Senate Select Committee, 498 F2d at 732.  
 476 Senate Select Committee, 370 F Supp at 522, citing Nixon, 487 F2d at 700.  
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case of a congressional subpoena would, of course, be a willingness on 
the part of the congressional committee to hear out the executive’s 
privilege claim. But this distinction was lost on a court accustomed to 
seeing everything through judicially tinted glasses. 
(Indeed, this distinction also provides a rejoinder to those who 
might argue that the judiciary ought to have a role in such disputes 
not because it is superior to the other branches, but rather because, in 
a dispute between two coequal branches, it is good to have the third 
coequal branch serve as a neutral arbiter. If this were true, then it 
should be the case that executive privilege claims raised in response to 
judicial proceedings—for example, the Nixon Tapes Case—should be 
submitted to Congress for neutral arbitration. If courts are the proper 
adjudicatory body for charges of executive branch contempt of court, 
then a claim that Congress is not the proper adjudicatory body for 
charges of executive branch contempt of Congress cannot be based on 
an appeal to the desirability of a third party arbiter.) 
Finally, it must be noted that courts tend to move at a pace that is 
poorly suited to Congress’s need for timely information: even if, at the 
end of the day, the courts ordered the executive branch official to turn 
over information to Congress, it might well come too late for Con-
gress’s purposes.
477
 
The result of the suite of executive privilege cases arising out of 
Watergate, then, was an assertion that executive privilege claims are 
stronger against Congress than they are against criminal process—
despite the facts that (a) the president is the federal prosecutor-in-
chief and should therefore be able to structure prosecutions as he sees 
fit;
478
 and (b) Congress has constitutionally assigned roles in oversee-
ing, including impeaching, executive branch officials.
479
 The conse-
quences of this assertion of power by the judiciary are far-reaching. 
There is significant public benefit in being governed by those who 
are—and are seen to be—capable of transcending narrow personal and 
partisan interest and pursuing a broader public interest.
480
 As Robert 
                                                                                                                           
 477 See Stanley M. Brand and Sean Connelly, Constitutional Confrontations: Preserving a 
Prompt and Orderly Means by Which Congress May Enforce Investigative Demands against 
Executive Branch Officials, 36 Cath U L Rev 71, 81, 84 (1986) (noting the effect of delay in the 
Gorsuch case). 
 478 See Akhil Reed Amar, Nixon’s Shadow, 83 Minn L Rev 1405, 1405–06 (1999) (arguing 
that the Court was wrong to order Nixon to turn the tapes over to the Watergate special prosecu-
tor, who, constitutionally, could only be an inferior executive branch officer). 
 479 See Part V.A.2.  
 480 I have defended this republican vision of public service at greater length in Chafetz, 58 
Duke L J at 182–83, 224–36 (cited in note 52); Josh Chafetz, Curing Congress’s Ills: Criminal Law 
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Burt has noted, the House of Representatives’ conduct in the Nixon 
impeachment inquiry was meant to reinforce this republican conception 
of service, which the president’s actions had badly tarnished: 
In the conduct of its deliberations, the [House Judiciary] Com-
mittee worked assiduously to avoid the actuality or the appear-
ance of partisan divisions. In its decision to subpoena the Nixon 
tapes on its own authority, without recourse to judicial enforce-
ment proceedings, the Committee signified that it would not ad-
mit that the judiciary had become the sole institutional reposito-
ry of impartial judgment.
481 
But “[t]he Supreme Court’s intervention in the Nixon Tapes case ab-
orted this redemptive process,”
482
 by hastily and immodestly swooping 
in and demanding that the tapes be turned over to the courts. Al-
though Burt does not discuss the Senate Select Committee case, it 
makes his argument that much stronger—not only did the courts de-
mand that the tapes be turned over to themselves, but they denied 
that Congress had a right to them, as well. In insisting that they, and 
only they, could stand up to Nixon, the courts reinforced the notion 
that Congress was impotent at best, corrupt at worst—that, in Gerald 
Gunther’s words, “somehow it is the Court’s special obligation to save 
the nation in episodes of constitutional crisis.”
483
 The courts thus made 
themselves the heroes of the Watergate story, but only by acting in 
such a way as to suggest that Congress was not up to the task. The 
more frequently such suggestions are made and absorbed by the public, 
of course, the lower Congress’s reserve of institutional legitimacy falls, 
and the less able it is to assert a strong institutional role in the future. 
This, in turn, only reinforces a conception of politics as inherently de-
based, a conception that is deeply inimical to self-government.
484
 
                                                                                                                           
as the Wrong Paradigm for Congressional Ethics, 117 Yale L J Pocket Part 238, 239–42 (2008), 
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 483 Gerald Gunther, Judicial Hegemony and Legislative Autonomy: The Nixon Case and the 
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If these disputes should not be in the courts, then what can Con-
gress do when an executive branch officer refuses to comply with a 
subpoena? First, and most crudely, each house has a sergeant-at-arms, 
and the Capitol building has its own jail. The sergeant can be sent to 
arrest contemnors and, if necessary, hold them in his custody until ei-
ther their contempt is purged or the congressional session ends. In-
deed, we have seen that a house of Congress has twice arrested and 
held executive branch officials—Seward and Marshall. Undoubtedly, 
the contemnor would then seek habeas relief from a court, but such 
relief should be narrowly circumscribed. The court, like the Marshall 
and Powell courts,
485
 could inquire into whether the house was jurisdic-
tionally competent to hold the contemnor—that is, whether he was, in 
fact, accused of something that properly qualifies as a contempt of 
Congress—but it could not inquire into the merits. As noted above, 
defiance of a congressional subpoena is clearly within Congress’s con-
tempt power;
486
 the house of Congress itself, then, and not a court on 
collateral review, is the proper tribunal to adjudicate an executive pri-
vilege defense. 
Short of sending its sergeant out trolling the streets, the House of 
Representatives can always begin impeachment proceedings to vindi-
cate its contempt finding.
487
 Even former executive branch officials may 
be impeached,
488
 and the punishment may encompass “disqualification 
to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United 
States.”
489
 The Senate may always refuse to confirm the president’s no-
minees to positions in the administration
490
—for example, stalling any 
new Justice Department appointments until its concerns about the 
running of the Department are addressed. Congress also has the pow-
er of the purse—like the colonial legislatures,
491
 Congress can simply 
zero-out the salary of a specific official.
492
 Finally, Congress can, like 
                                                                                                                           
 485 See text accompanying notes 466–469. 
 486 See Part V.A.3.  
 487 See US Const Art I, § 2, cl 5 (“The House of Representatives . . . shall have the sole 
Power of Impeachment.”). 
 488 See generally Brian C. Kalt, The Constitutional Case for the Impeachability of Former 
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the House of Lords during the Arundel controversy, simply refuse to 
turn to matters that the president cares about until its concerns are 
addressed. In its most extreme form, Congress can shut down the fed-
eral government by refusing to pass a budget.
493
 Importantly, none of 
these options requires cooperation from another branch. None of 
them constitutes a concession by Congress that it is unable to carry 
out its constitutional role without help. 
B. Miers, Redux 
From this vantage, the problem in Miers is that every actor except 
Congress is being institutionally supremacist. The executive branch 
has made wide-ranging assertions of privilege and announced that it 
will exercise its own independent legal judgment in refusing to prose-
cute Miers and Bolten for criminal contempt. The court has referred 
to itself as the “ultimate arbiter” of executive privilege claims in all 
contexts and has treated its own hearing of the case as unproblematic. 
Only Congress has proven unsure of its own powers by seeking a judi-
cial declaration that Miers and Bolten must comply with its subpoe-
nas. As we have seen, the houses of Congress undoubtedly have the 
right to issue subpoenas, and they undoubtedly have the right to hold 
anyone in contempt who defies those subpoenas. They also have en-
forcement options at their disposal. By going to court, instead of using 
their own enforcement mechanisms, they further ratify the notions 
that only the courts act in a principled manner and that the courts 
must therefore watch over the actions of the political branches. By 
seeking judicial approval of their actions, they implicitly acknowledge 
that the judiciary has the final word. But why should it? This is a mat-
ter between the legislative and executive branches. The Constitution 
does not set the judiciary up as a parent figure, ready to solve disputes 
between fractious political siblings. 
And what of the court’s repeated insistence that it is the “ulti-
mate arbiter” of executive privilege claims?
494
 It is worth noting that 
the Supreme Court referred to itself as the “ultimate arbiter” of any-
                                                                                                                           
priated funds to pay the salary of an identified position or, in one notorious instance, three spe-
cifically named officials.”). 
 493 See Peter M. Shane, When Inter-branch Norms Break Down: Of Arms-for-hostages, 
“Orderly Shutdowns,” Presidential Impeachments, and Judicial “Coups,” 12 Cornell J L & Pub 
Policy 503, 516–21 (2003) (describing two shutdowns of the federal government in 1995 resulting 
from congressional refusal to pass a budget unless President Bill Clinton relented on certain 
policy matters). 
 494 Committee on the Judiciary v Miers, 558 F Supp 2d 53, 56, 76, 96, 103, 107 (DDC 2008) 
(referring to the judiciary as the “ultimate arbiter”).  
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thing only once before the twentieth century—and that was in the 
context of denying a claim that state courts could have the final say as 
to the extent of federal jurisdiction.
495
 In matters that are properly be-
fore a federal court, that court may well be the ultimate arbiter of the 
law.
496
 But this principle cannot give us a theory of which matters are 
properly before a federal court.
497
 The courts have never offered a per-
suasive reason why a congressional subpoena to an executive branch 
official is a matter of which the judiciary can properly take notice. 
Meanwhile, while the judiciary took its time considering the case, con-
cerns about the pace of judicial proceedings were largely borne out. 
Although a settlement was eventually reached, the Congress that origi-
nally issued the subpoenas had ended, as had the administration that 
the subpoenas were intended to help Congress oversee.
498
 To the extent 
that enforcement of congressional subpoenas is left to the courts, future 
administrations now know that they can delay compliance for years. 
The Miers court was also concerned about the possibility of  
a stand-off between the Sergeant-at-Arms and executive branch 
law enforcement officials concerning taking Mr. Bolten into cus-
tody and detaining him. Such unseemly, provocative clashes 
should be avoided, and there is no need to run the risk of such 
mischief when a civil action can resolve the same issues in an or-
derly fashion.
499
 
Note carefully the unstated premise here: the executive might resist 
the House sergeant, but it would never dare resist a court order. Why 
risk political “mischief” when everything can be handled in a nice, 
neat, orderly, “civil,” judicial manner? The Miers court was apparently 
unaware that the executive branch sometimes disobeys even the judi-
ciary.
500
 Presumably such disobedience would be met with a finding of 
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contempt of court—followed, perhaps, by a “stand-off between [judi-
cial marshals] and executive branch law enforcement officials.”
501
 But 
even if, as an empirical matter, the executive branch was more likely 
to obey a court order than a congressional one, the court erred in 
treating this fact as somehow exogenous to its ruling. If the courts are 
treated as the only institutions that make reasoned, principled judg-
ments, then it stands to reason that people will come to accord greater 
legitimacy to those judgments. But that does not mean that the courts 
are the only institutions that make such judgments. Nonjudicial insti-
tutions can still behave judiciously, and, as we have seen, the congres-
sional committees investigating Nixon were careful to behave in such 
a manner.
502
 Indeed, so were the congressional committees investigat-
ing the United States Attorneys firings, holding numerous hearings 
and making repeated attempts at negotiation before issuing the con-
tempt citations. The court, in sweeping aside the results of that process, 
once again projected an air of legitimacy at the expense of Congress. 
And Congress not only let the court do it; it asked the court to do it. 
CONCLUSION 
For centuries, the contempt power has served Anglo-American 
legislatures well in their clashes with executive authorities. For nearly 
all of that time, legislative houses themselves have enforced their con-
tempt power, using either their sergeants or any of the other political 
weapons at their disposal. Since the 1970s, however, the courts have 
entered into the fray, claiming the right to determine the merits of 
disputes between the political branches over the extent of the con-
tempt power. Congress has, shortsightedly, been an enthusiastic sup-
porter of the courts’ arrogation of this power. This has had short-term 
deleterious consequences for Congress, as when the courts ruled that 
Nixon did not have to turn tapes over to the Senate Select Committee. 
Less apparent but more insidious are the long-term consequences. In 
abdicating such matters to the courts, Congress has furthered the per-
ception that the courts are the sole repository of the republican virtue 
of reasoned and impartial judgment. As the executive continues to 
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make expansive claims for its powers and privileges, and as courts 
continue to position themselves as the “ultimate arbiters” of inter-
branch conflicts, Congress has ceded ground to both. Given that Con-
gress is the most broadly representative branch, and given that a 
strong Congress would help check an increasingly strong executive 
branch, this development is unfortunate for the body politic. 
